Corporate Governance Reform and the Cost of Debt Financing of Listed French Companies

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles Piot ◽  
Franck Missonier-Piera
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Debt Financing ◽  
Cost Of Debt ◽  
Governance Reform ◽  
Corporate Governance Reform ◽  
The Cost

Does Corporate Governance Matter to Bondholders?

2005 ◽  
Vol 40 (4) ◽  
pp. 693-719 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark S. Klock ◽  
Sattar A. Mansi ◽  
William F. Maxwell
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Lower Cost ◽  
Bond Market ◽  
Debt Financing ◽  
Cost Of Debt ◽  
Firm Level ◽  
Shareholder Protection ◽  
Level Data ◽  
Firm Level Data ◽  
The Cost

AbstractWe examine the relation between the cost of debt financing and a governance index that contains various antitakeover and shareholder protection provisions. Using firm-level data from the Investors Research Responsibility Center for the period 1990–2000, we find that antitakeover governance provisions lower the cost of debt financing. Segmenting the data into firms with the strongest management rights (strongest antitakeover provisions) and firms with the strongest shareholder rights (weakest antitakeover provisions), we find that strong antitakeover provisions are associated with a lower cost of debt financing while weak antitakeover provisions are associated with a higher cost of debt financing, with a difference of about 34 basis points between the two groups. Overall, the results suggest that antitakeover governance provisions, although not beneficial to stockholders, are viewed favorably in the bond market.

scholarly journals Corporate governance, bankruptcy law and firms’ debt financing under uncertainty

2008 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 47-51 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruno Funchal ◽  
Fernando Caio Galdi ◽  
Paulo C. Coimbra
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Interest Rate ◽  
Debt Financing ◽  
Cost Of Debt ◽  
Bankruptcy Law ◽  
Investment Projects ◽  
Negative Effect ◽  
The Cost ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Positive Effect

This paper examines the relationship between corporate governance level and the bankruptcy law to such debt variables as firms’ cost of debt and amount of debt under uncertainty (in the Knight´s sense). First we find that the better the corporate governance and the harsher bankruptcy law, the lower the cost of debt. Second, we find that better governance and a harsher bankruptcy laws have a positive effect on debt. As consequence, firms increase their set of investment projects financed by creditors. Finally, uncertainty has a negative effect on terms of debt (higher interest rate and smaller set of financed investment projects) and such effect is stronger for firms with worse corporate governance and for economies with a bankruptcy law that is lenient to debtors.

Extending the benefits of ESG disclosure: The effect on the cost of debt financing

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicola Raimo ◽  
Alessandra Caragnano ◽  
Marianna Zito ◽  
Filippo Vitolla ◽  
Massimo Mariani
Keyword(s):  
Debt Financing ◽  
Cost Of Debt ◽  
The Cost

scholarly journals Corporate Governance Quality and Capital Structure Decisions: Empirical Evidence from Canada

2019 ◽  
Vol 6 (9) ◽  
pp. 303-311
Author(s):  
Dan Lin ◽  
Lu Lin
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Capital Structure ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Composite Index ◽  
Free Cash Flow ◽  
Debt Financing ◽  
Cost Of Debt ◽  
Financing Decisions ◽  
Governance Quality ◽  
Corporate Governance Quality

This study examines the relationship between corporate governance quality and capital structure of firms listed on the S&P/TSX composite index between 2009 and 2012. Using an aggregate corporate governance index, this study finds support for the outcome hypothesis, which argues that capital structure is an “outcome” of corporate governance quality. Governance quality is found to be positively associated with firms’ leverage. Firms with lower governance quality have lower leverage as these firms’ managers do not like to have only little free cash flow leftover or have extra constraints imposed by debt financing. In contrast, firms with higher governance quality are more leveraged because these firms have lower agency costs and thus lower cost of debt financing. As a result, they can take on more debts. The empirical evidence from this study illuminates important links between governance quality and financing decisions of firms.

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