Perceived Job Security, Health Status and Sick-Leave: A Study on Moral Hazard in the Swedish Social Sickness Insurance System

2006 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jahangir Khan ◽  
Kristina Burstrom ◽  
Clas Rehnberg
Keyword(s):  
Health Status ◽  
Sick Leave ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Job Security ◽  
Sickness Insurance ◽  
Insurance System

scholarly journals Social validity of work ability evaluations and official decisions within the sickness insurance system: A client perspective

Work ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Elin A. Karlsson ◽  
Jan L. Sandqvist ◽  
Ida Seing ◽  
Christian Ståhl
Keyword(s):  
Content Analysis ◽  
Sick Leave ◽  
Work Ability ◽  
Social Validity ◽  
Sickness Insurance ◽  
Client Perspective ◽  
Insurance System ◽  
System A ◽  
The Social ◽  
Sickness Benefits

BACKGROUND: Studies of the social validity of work ability evaluations are rare, although the concept can provide valuable information about the acceptability, comprehensibility and importance of procedures. OBJECTIVE: The aim of this study was to explore clients’ perceptions of social validity of work ability evaluations and the following official decisions concerning sickness benefits within the Swedish sickness insurance system. METHODS: This was a longitudinal qualitative study based on interviews with 30 clients on sick leave, analyzed through deductive content analysis. RESULTS: Clients’ understanding of the evaluation was dependent on whether the specific tests were perceived as clearly related to the clients’ situation and what information they received. For a fair description of their work ability, clients state that the strict structure in the evaluation is not relevant to everyone. CONCLUSION: The work ability evaluations indicate low acceptability due to lack of individual adaptation, the comprehensibility varied depending on the applicability of the evaluation and information provided, while the dimension ‘importance’ indicated as higher degree of social validity. The official decision about sickness benefits however was considered unrelated to the evaluation results, lacking solid arguments and sometimes contradictory to other stakeholders’ recommendations indicating poor social validity.

scholarly journals Exploring Interactions in the Sickness Insurance System in Terms of Power and Trust

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elin A. Karlsson ◽  
Jan L. Sandqvist ◽  
Ida Seing ◽  
Christian Ståhl
Keyword(s):  
Qualitative Study ◽  
Social Security ◽  
Sick Leave ◽  
Return To Work ◽  
Thematic Analysis ◽  
Main Theme ◽  
Structured Interviews ◽  
Sickness Insurance ◽  
Insurance System ◽  
Case Files

AbstractPurpose Activation policies and efforts to reduce sick leave rates has influenced sickness insurance systems in Western countries, which has led to social security being more connected with work and attempts to expose malingering among the sickness absent. The aim of this study was to explore how power and trust are expressed by clients and stakeholders within the Swedish sickness insurance system. Methods This was a longitudinal qualitative study based on semi structured interviews and case files from 31 clients on sick leave in Sweden. Data was analyzed using a thematic analysis. Results The main theme ‘Acts of power and distrust’ illustrates how stakeholders’ express suspicions towards each other, and how clients need to demonstrate desire and efforts to return to work which other stakeholders verified. Conclusions The clients desire to prove themselves able to contribute to society was prominent in this study and power relations need to be acknowledged, in particular between client and the SIA. Further, to preserve citizens trust in the system, the system needs to demonstrate trust also in the clients.

scholarly journals The Effects on Sick Leave of Changes in the Sickness Insurance System

2004 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-113 ◽  
Author(s):  
Magnus Henrekson ◽  
Mats Persson
Keyword(s):  
Sick Leave ◽  
Sickness Insurance ◽  
Insurance System

It’s a Party in the MLB: An Analysis of Shirking Between Games in Major League Baseball

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Richard J. Paulsen
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Inverse Relationship ◽  
Major League Baseball ◽  
Job Security ◽  
Baseball Player ◽  
Difference In Differences ◽  
Estimation Strategy ◽  
Major League ◽  
Triple Difference ◽  
And Performance

This paper uses game-level Major League Baseball data to identify whether players with greater job security shirk in their preparation between games. Past work has identified evidence of moral hazard arising in multiyear Major League Baseball player contracts, but little work has been done in identifying when shirking takes place. Using a difference-in-differences estimation strategy, this study finds evidence of an inverse relationship between the number of years remaining on player contracts and performance when the player is playing on short rest, when opportunity to rest is scarce, but not on long rest. Using a triple-difference specification, evidence is found that this inverse relationship between years remaining on a player’s contract when playing on short rest occurs for games played in “party cities.” This evidence would suggest that between game preparation is one avenue through which players on multiyear contracts shirk.

scholarly journals Swedish rehabilitation professionals' perspectives on work ability assessments in a changing sickness insurance system

2011 ◽  
Vol 33 (15-16) ◽  
pp. 1373-1382 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Ståhl ◽  
Tommy Svensson ◽  
Gunilla Petersson ◽  
Kerstin Ekberg
Keyword(s):  
Work Ability ◽  
Sickness Insurance ◽  
Insurance System ◽  
Rehabilitation Professionals

scholarly journals Moral Hazard in a Mutual Health Insurance System: German Knappschaften, 1867–1914

2011 ◽  
Vol 71 (1) ◽  
pp. 70-104 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy W. Guinnane ◽  
Jochen Streb
Keyword(s):  
Nineteenth Century ◽  
Health Insurance ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Old Age ◽  
Econometric Models ◽  
Accident Insurance ◽  
Health Insurance System ◽  
Insurance System ◽  
System Today ◽  
Sick Pay

TheKnappschaftwas a mutual association through which German miners insured themselves against accident, illness, and old age. TheKnappschaftunderlies Bismarck's sickness and accident insurance legislation, and thus Germany's system today. This article focuses on moral hazard, which plagued theKnappschaftenin the later nineteenth century. Sick pay made it attractive for miners to feign illness that made them unable to work. We outline the moral hazard problem theKnappschaftenfaced as well as the mechanisms they devised to control it, and then use econometric models to demonstrate that those mechanisms were at best imperfect.

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