NHL Team Production

2006 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Jerald Heyne ◽  
Aju J. Fenn ◽  
Stacey Brook
Keyword(s):  
Team Production

scholarly journals Team production with inequity-averse agents

2009 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 119-136 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jianpei Li
Keyword(s):  
Team Production

scholarly journals Nonbinding Goals in Teams: A Real Effort Coordination Experiment

2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (5) ◽  
pp. 1026-1044
Author(s):  
James Fan ◽  
Joaquín Gómez-Miñambres
Keyword(s):  
Energy Use ◽  
Weak Link ◽  
Human Subjects ◽  
Individual Performance ◽  
Problem Definition ◽  
Reference Points ◽  
Team Production ◽  
Team Members ◽  
Managerial Implications ◽  
The Impact

Problem definition: We investigate the impact of nonbinding (wage-irrelevant) goals, set by a manager, on a team of workers with “weak-link” production technology. Can nonbinding goals improve team production when team members face production complementarity? Academic/practical relevance: Nonbinding goals are easy to implement and ubiquitous in practice. These goals have been shown to improve individual performance, but it remains to be seen if such goals are effective in team production when there is production complementarity among workers. Methodology: We first develop a theoretical model where goals act as reference points for workers’ intrinsic motivation to complete the task. We then test our hypotheses in a controlled, human-subjects experiment. In our experiment, participants act as managers or workers, and we examine the impact of nonbinding goals on team outcomes. Results: Consistent with our model, we find evidence that team production does increase when managers are able to set goals. This effect is strongest when goals are challenging but attainable for weak-link workers. However, we also find evidence that many managers assign goals that are too challenging for weak-link workers, resulting in suboptimal team production, lower profits, and higher wasted performance (performance above the weak-link level). Managerial implications: Our analysis indicates that goals are effective motivators in teams, but some managers may have difficulty overcoming personal biases when setting goals. The task of setting team goals is more complex than setting individual goals, and many managers can benefit from training on how to set good goals for the team. Moreover, our finding that suboptimal goals also increase wasted performance suggests that improving goal-setting strategies is especially important in production settings where overperformance is costly for the firm (scrap, energy use, inventory costs, lower prices as a result of oversupply, etc.).

Team production in economics: division of labor or mentoring?

1995 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-40 ◽  
Author(s):  
David N. Laband ◽  
Michael J. Piette
Keyword(s):  
Division Of Labor ◽  
Team Production

An experimental test of behavior under team production

2010 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-51 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donald Vandegrift ◽  
Abdullah Yavas
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Test ◽  
Team Production

Optimal Team Size and Monitoring in Organizations

2008 ◽  
Vol 83 (3) ◽  
pp. 789-822 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pierre Jinghong Liang ◽  
Madhav V. Rajan ◽  
Korok Ray
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Variables ◽  
Pay For Performance ◽  
Incentive Contracts ◽  
Team Size ◽  
Team Production ◽  
Trade Off ◽  
Team Structure ◽  
Production Team ◽  
Equilibrium Level ◽  
The Impact

We formulate and analyze a model of team structure and monitoring within a Linear-Exponential-Normal (LEN) agency framework. We incorporate three key instruments in the internal design of an organization involving team production: team size, monitoring activities, and incentive contracts. We show that the complex tradeoffs among these instruments lead to surprisingly simple implications. One such result is that the equilibrium level of pay-for-performance for workers is attenuated and is, at times, invariant to most environmental variables of interest. As such, our model helps explain the empirical puzzle of the lack of a trade-off for risk/incentives shown in standard agency models. Our work also demonstrates the presence of complementarities between team size and monitoring, and between worker talent and managerial monitoring ability. Finally, we derive predictions about the impact of environmental variables on the choice of optimal team size, incentives, and employee quality, even in the presence of an external marketplace for talent.

scholarly journals Board Leadership and Strategy Involvement in Small Firms: A Team Production Approach

2011 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 368-383 ◽  
Author(s):  
Silke Machold ◽  
Morten Huse ◽  
Alessandro Minichilli ◽  
Mattias Nordqvist
Keyword(s):  
Small Firms ◽  
Team Production ◽  
Board Leadership ◽  
Production Approach
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