scholarly journals Experimental Study of Effectiveness of Nonpoint Source Water Pollution Control Group Contract

2006 ◽  
Author(s):  
Helen N. Pushkarskaya ◽  
Hal R. Arkes
Keyword(s):  
Water Pollution ◽  
Experimental Study ◽  
Pollution Control ◽  
Nonpoint Source ◽  
Control Group ◽  
Source Water ◽  
Water Pollution Control

scholarly journals Multiple Agents, and Agricultural Nonpoint-Source Water Pollution Control Policies

1999 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rodney B.W. Smith ◽  
Theodore D. Tomasi
Keyword(s):  
Water Pollution ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Pollution Control ◽  
Design Theory ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Management Practice ◽  
Nonpoint Source ◽  
Source Water ◽  
Prior Literature ◽  
Agricultural Nonpoint Source

Assuming asymmetric information over farmer profits and zero transaction costs, prior literature has suggested that when regulating nonpoint source water pollution, a tax on management practices (inputs) can implement full-information allocations and is superior to a tax on estimated runoff. Using mechanism design theory under asymmetric information, this paper shows that under the same assumptions, management practice taxes and taxes on estimated runoff are equally efficient.

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