Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure

1998 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael C. Jensen ◽  
William H. Meckling
Keyword(s):  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Agency Costs ◽  
Theory Of The Firm ◽  
Managerial Behavior

scholarly journals O TEMA “CUSTOS” EM PERIÓDICOS DA ENGENHARIA DE PRODUÇÃO: UMA ANÁLISE BIBLIOMÉTRICA E PERSPECTIVAS FUTURAS

2015 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Tiago Henrique De Paula Alvarenga ◽  
Simone Sartori ◽  
Jairo José Assumpção ◽  
Lucila Maria Souza Campos
Keyword(s):  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Agency Costs ◽  
Operational Research ◽  
Theory Of The Firm ◽  
Management Science ◽  
Production Economics ◽  
Managerial Behavior

<p><em>O objetivo desse artigo é realizar um mapeamento das publicações sobre o tema custos na engenharia de produção e, como consequência, identificar um portfólio bibliográfico das publicações na área. Para atender ao objetivo, fez-se uma análise bibliométrica nos dois principais periódicos brasileiros especializados na área de engenharia de produção (Produção – ISSN 0103-6513 e Gestão &amp; Produção – ISSN 0104-530X). Após a busca, foram selecionados 43 artigos relevantes e 540 artigos de referências, que passaram a representar o portfólio bibliográfico. Na análise bibliométrica do portfólio bibliográfico evidencia-se: o autor mais citado “José Luis Duarte Ribeiro”; o artigo com maior reconhecimento científico "Competitividade e coordenação de sistemas agroindustriais: um ensaio conceitual" de Elizabeth M. M. Q. Farina com 130 citações; as palavras-chave mais presentes “custos de transação” e “custos”; o método de pesquisa mais usado é o “estudo de caso” (46% dos casos são únicos e 54% são múltiplos). Na análise das referências do portfólio bibliográfico destaca-se: os periódicos “Management Science”, “European Journal of Operational Research” e “International Journal of Production Economics”; o autor mais citado “Mohamad Y. Jaber”; em relação ao reconhecimento científico o artigo "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure” de Michael C. Jensen e William H. Meckling, com 44.083 citações. Tal estudo permitiu descobrir as características de publicações do campo e com isso visualizar a evolução científica, os principais autores, os periódicos mais relevantes, as palavras-chave mais utilizadas e características distintivas que integraram os estudos realizados. </em></p>

Agency Costs, Mispricing, and Ownership Structure

CFA Digest ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 14-16
Author(s):  
Gregory G. Gocek
Keyword(s):  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Agency Costs

Technological Change and the Theory of the Firm: The American Locomotive Industry, 1920–1955

1976 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas G. Marx
Keyword(s):  
Technological Change ◽  
Theory Of The Firm ◽  
Managerial Behavior ◽  
Dominant Firms

This study analyzes the differing managerial behavior of the three dominant firms in the steam locomotive oligopoly as diesel locomotives replaced steam.

scholarly journals Ownership Structure And Managerial Behavior To Beat Market Expectation In Korea

2014 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 1063
Author(s):  
Hyewon Paik ◽  
YunSung Koh
Keyword(s):  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Stock Price ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Foreign Ownership ◽  
Managerial Behavior ◽  
Analyst Expectations ◽  
Earnings Surprises ◽  
Large Shareholders ◽  
Market Expectations ◽  
Negative Earnings

This paper examines whether firms ownership structure in Korea changes managers' behavior to meet or beat market expectations. We examine whether managers manage earnings upward and/or guide analyst expectations downward to avoid negative earnings surprises. By using companies listed on the Korean Stock Exchange, we find that the inclusion of a higher proportion of foreign ownership significantly increases the probability to meet or beat market expectations. The finding suggests that the firms with higher foreign ownership try to satisfy their foreign investors who emphasize current profits by boosting the stock price. We also find that managers are less likely to avoid negative earnings surprises as large shareholders ownership increases. The results imply that large shareholders play an internal monitoring role for managers' earnings and/or expectations management. In addition, firms with large shareholders ownership rely less on income-increasing discretionary accruals. Our findings supports the convergence-of-interest hypothesis that as the controlling shareholders ownership level increases, the interest of the controlling shareholder decreases managers opportunistic behavior to manage earnings.

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