scholarly journals Presidential Signing Statements and Executive Power

2006 ◽  
Author(s):  
Curtis A. Bradley ◽  
Eric A. Posner
Keyword(s):  
Executive Power ◽  
Signing Statements

The Logic of Presidential Signing Statements

2012 ◽  
Vol 66 (1) ◽  
pp. 141-153 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ian Ostrander ◽  
Joel Sievert
Keyword(s):  
Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Original Data ◽  
Executive Power ◽  
Signing Statements ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Prior Literature

Signing statements constitute a salient executive power that has recently captured scholarly and political attention. Prior literature suggests that presidents use signing statements to gain additional policy concessions from Congress. Evidence of policy motivations are, however, difficult to demonstrate and policy motives fail to explain a wide range of existing statements. The authors propose an additional incentive mechanism based on defending traditional presidential authority. Using original data on approximately 8,500 public laws and 1,250 signing statements, the authors investigate when and why signing statements occur. They find presidents are likely to issue constitutional signing statements on bills traditionally falling under the president’s purview.

scholarly journals Presidential Constitutional Interpretation, Signing Statements, Executive Power and Zivotofsky

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henry L. Chambers
Keyword(s):  
Executive Power ◽  
Constitutional Interpretation ◽  
Aggressive Approach ◽  
Signing Statements ◽  
Legal Document

This Article explores whether the President should interpret the Constitution aggressively and, if so, whether the President should act on such aggressive interpretations. Part I examines whether the presidential oath and other constitutional duties obligate the President to interpret the Constitution. Part II considers constitutional signing statements as the manifestation of an aggressive approach to presidential constitutional interpretation. Part III considers whether the Constitution is a legal document or a political document, and how that determination might affect how aggressive the President should be when interpreting the Constitution. Part IV considers how the Supreme Court's and Congress's constitutional interpretations might constrain presidential constitutional interpretation or suggest restrained presidential constitutional interpretation. Part V considers Zivotofsky v. Kerry and whether it provides the President additional arguments to support an aggressive approach to constitutional interpretation, particularly when considering matters related to executive power.

scholarly journals Presidential Signing Statements and Dialogic Constitutionalism

AJIL Unbound ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 109 ◽  
pp. 51-56 ◽  
Author(s):  
Catherine Powell
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
New York Times ◽  
Executive Branch ◽  
Executive Power ◽  
The New York Times ◽  
Signing Statements ◽  
Imperial Presidency ◽  
The Supreme Court

When the Supreme Court held that the executive branch has exclusive authority to recognize foreign sovereigns in the Jerusalem passport case, Zivotofsky v. Kerry (Zivotofsky II), Jack Goldsmith hailed the decision as a “vindication” of presidential signing statements and executive power. Indeed, in the context of the debate over the treatment of the terror suspects, the New York Times had called such signing statements the “constitutionally ludicrous” work of an overreaching, “imperial presidency.”

scholarly journals The Law: President Obama's Signing Statements and the Expansion of Executive Power

2013 ◽  
Vol 43 (4) ◽  
pp. 883-899 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey Crouch ◽  
Mark J. Rozell ◽  
Mitchel A. Sollenberger
Keyword(s):  
Executive Power ◽  
Signing Statements ◽  
The Law

Modernization of Antimonopoly Policy in Russia (Economic Analysis of Proposed Changes in the Competition Law)

2005 ◽  
pp. 100-116
Author(s):  
S. Avdasheva ◽  
A. Shastitko
Keyword(s):  
Economic Analysis ◽  
Financial Markets ◽  
Financial Services ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Commodity Markets ◽  
State Aid ◽  
Executive Power ◽  
Rule Of Reason ◽  
Per Se

The article is devoted to the analysis of the draft law "On Protection of Competition", which must substitute the laws "On Competition and Limitation of Monopolistic Activity on Commodity Markets" and "On Protection of Competition on the Financial Services Market". The innovations enhancing the quality of Russian competition law and new norms providing at least ambiguous effects on antimonopoly regulation are considered. The first group of positive measures includes unification of competition norms for commodity and financial markets, changes of criteria and the scale of control of economic concentrations, specification of conditions, where norms are applied "per se" and according to the "rule of reason", introduction of rules that can prevent the restriction of competition by the executive power. The interpretation of the "collective dominance" concept and certain rules devoted to antimonopoly control of state aid are in the second group of questionable steps.

Presidential Privilege and the Freedom of Information Act

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin M. Baron
Keyword(s):  
Social Learning ◽  
Historical Analysis ◽  
Public Information ◽  
Executive Branch ◽  
Executive Power ◽  
Power Dynamics ◽  
Freedom Of Information ◽  
Freedom Of Information Act ◽  
Contemporary Politics ◽  
Government Secrecy

Executive privilege (EP) as a political tool has created a grey area of constitutional power between the legislative and executive branches. By focusing on the post-WWII political usage of executive privilege, this research utilizes a social learning perspective to examine the power dynamics between Congress and the president when it comes to government secrecy and public information. Social learning provides the framework to understand how the Cold War's creation of the modern American security state led to a paradigm shift in the executive branch. This shift altered the politics of the presidency and impacted relations with Congress through extensive use of EP and denial of congressional requests for information. When viewed through a social learning lens, the institutional politics surrounding the development of the Freedom of Information Act is intricately entwined with EP as a political power struggle of action-reaction between the executive and legislative branches. Using extensive archival research, this historical analysis examines the politics surrounding the modern use of executive privilege from Truman through Nixon as an action-reaction of checks on power from the president and Congress, where each learns and responds based on the others previous actions. The use of executive privilege led to the Freedom of Information Act showing how policy can serve as a congressional check on executive power, and how the politics surrounding this issue influence contemporary politics.

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