A Costly Signaling Theory of Hard Look Review

2006 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Caleb Stephenson
Keyword(s):  
Signaling Theory ◽  
Costly Signaling ◽  
Costly Signaling Theory

Monuments of the Hittite and Neo-Assyrian Empires During the Late Bronze and Iron Ages

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
James F. Osborne
Keyword(s):  
Recent Work ◽  
Signaling Theory ◽  
The Other ◽  
Costly Signaling ◽  
Evolutionary Anthropology ◽  
Costly Signaling Theory ◽  
Changes Over Time ◽  
Over Time

Chapter 5 engages with the Hittite and Assyrian monuments that are some of our oldest as well as most spectacular evidence for communications. For his discussion, Osborne exploits two interpretative concepts, one that he terms “relationality,” and the other, known as “costly signaling theory,” imported from recent work in evolutionary anthropology. Relationality calls for reckoning with changes over time in how a monument communicates messages and how it is perceived; costly signaling theory serves to explain why some monuments communicate more effectively if they are large and expensive. Both concepts assist in analyzing the ideological content of the monumental royal sculptures that form Osborne’s focus.

Self-Punishment Promotes Forgiveness in the Direct and Indirect Reciprocity Contexts

2017 ◽  
Vol 120 (3) ◽  
pp. 408-422 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruida Zhu ◽  
Xueyi Shen ◽  
Honghong Tang ◽  
Peixia Ye ◽  
Huagen Wang ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Signaling Theory ◽  
The Self ◽  
Moral Emotion ◽  
Costly Signaling ◽  
Indirect Reciprocity ◽  
Costly Signaling Theory ◽  
The Cost

Most previous studies regarding self-punishment have focused on the correlation between moral emotion and self-punishment. Only a few studies have attempted to understand self-punishment from the perspective of seeking forgiveness, and no study has yet directly tested whether wrongdoers’ self-punishment promotes others to forgive the wrongdoers. In three studies, the participants judged the wrongdoers’ self-punishment behaviors following an unfair allocation and reported the extent to which they forgave the wrongdoers. The results demonstrated that self-punishment did promote forgiveness in both the direct (Studies 1 and 2) and indirect reciprocity (Study 3) contexts. Consistent with costly signaling theory, the costlier the self-punishment was, the stronger the effect it had on forgiveness. Moreover, communicative self-punishment had a better effect than silent self-punishment when the cost was relatively high in the direct-reciprocity studies. These findings can guide us regarding how to address a damaged relationship via self-punishment when compensation is not feasible or acceptable.

scholarly journals Costly Signaling Theory of REM Sleep and Dreams

2007 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 147470490700500 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick McNamara ◽  
Reka Szent-Imrey
Keyword(s):  
Rem Sleep ◽  
Signaling Theory ◽  
Costly Signaling ◽  
Costly Signaling Theory

Man the Showoff? Or the Ascendance of a Just-so-Story: A Comment on Recent Applications of Costly Signaling Theory in American Archaeology

2007 ◽  
Vol 72 (2) ◽  
pp. 349-357 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian F. Codding ◽  
Terry L. Jones
Keyword(s):  
Great Basin ◽  
Signaling Theory ◽  
Archaeological Record ◽  
Costly Signaling ◽  
American Archaeology ◽  
Ethnographic Studies ◽  
Costly Signaling Theory ◽  
Middle Archaic ◽  
North American Prehistory ◽  
Considerable Body

In several recent, and highly provocative papers, McGuire and Hildebrandt (Hildebrandt and McGuire 2002, 2003; McGuire and Hildebrandt 2005) have helped introduce costly signaling theory into American archaeology. While their efforts are commendable, we feel that their reinterpretations of western North American prehistory overstate the likely influence of costly signaling on the archaeological record. Only by overlooking a considerable body of ethnographic literature that indicates a more limited role for signaling are they able to characterize Great Basin and California hunters as motivated more by the pursuit of prestige than provisioning. We offer three specific challenges to their models: (1) while McGuire and Hildebrandt treat the issue as decided, the relationships among foraging, provisioning, prestige, and fitness is still actively contested among researchers; (2) while ethnographic studies suggest that some types of hunting and low-return, high-risk activities may indeed represent attempts by males to signal costly behavior, these activities contribute very little to the faunal and other residues that accumulate in the archaeological record; and (3) the theoretical underpinnings of costly signaling explicitly preclude the type of runaway positive feedback loops that Hildebrandt and McGuire implicate as the driving force behind an apparent cultural collapse in the Great Basin at the end of the Middle Archaic.

Costly Signaling and the Ascendance of No-Can-Do Archaeology: A Reply to Codding and Jones

2007 ◽  
Vol 72 (2) ◽  
pp. 358-365 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kelly R. McGuire ◽  
William R. Hildebrandt ◽  
Kimberly L. Carpenter
Keyword(s):  
Theoretical Approach ◽  
Methodological Approach ◽  
Signaling Theory ◽  
Archaeological Record ◽  
Costly Signaling ◽  
Temporal Dimension ◽  
Alternative Framework ◽  
Ethnographic Studies ◽  
Costly Signaling Theory

While providing a review of some of the ethnographic literature surrounding hunting and Costly Signaling Theory, Codding and Jones offer no alternative framework for how this emerging theoretical approach might be applied to the archaeological record. In their view, Costly Signaling Theory lies beyond the pale of current archaeological inquiry, or at least our conception of it. We respond to this characterization by providing a specific methodological approach, combined with several additional applications, that answer Codding and Jones's call for greater linkage between the theory and the archaeological record. Ultimately, we believe that the archaeological record, with its temporal dimension, may illuminate some of the underlying aspects of Costly Signaling Theory that are otherwise obscured by more synchronic ethnographic studies.

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