Comparing Constitutional Review by the European Court of Justice and the U.S. Supreme Court

Author(s):  
Michel Rosenfeld
ICL Journal ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Antonios E. Kouroutakis

AbstractInstitutions such as the US Supreme Court and the European Court of Justice in due time have developed a status of supremacy through judicial activism. The main target of the article is to identify the judicial activism exercised by these Courts and to reason its need in the legal order. In the first part the US Supreme Court and the European Court of Justice are placed in the overall polity that they belong to and the development of their status and their characteristics are analyzed. The major concern of the first part is to examine how those declared their supremacy and focus on major cases and their reason­ing.In the second part the extent of the judicial supremacy in each legal order is discussed and its effects in the decision making process are examined. The assumption that judicial activ­ism is acceptable only if it expresses consensus in the legal order is tested and it is argued that up to an extent, Judicial Activism does not distort the political agenda when it ex­presses the consensus of the legal system. Finally, it is argued that when such activism exceeds the boundaries of the consensus, the other actors in the legal system would even­tually react and would limit such activism.


2010 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 293-305
Author(s):  
Norel Neagu

AbstractThis article deals with the possibility of changing the approach to appeals in the interest of law in Romania according to the relevant guidelines extracted from the case law of the European Court of Justice. It provides a comparative analysis of Romanian Supreme Court decisions with those of the European Court of Justice with respect to guiding principles versus a strict interpretation of written legislation. The author highlights a modern path for the Romanian Court to follow in light of the requirements of the twenty-first century.


2015 ◽  
pp. 73-93
Author(s):  
MONA-MARIA PIVNICERU ◽  
KAROLY BENKE

This study aims at presenting a more complex image of the principle of proportionality through an analysis that combines the theoretical and the jurisprudential perspectives. The precondition of this analysis is the classic opinion of this originally German principle which requires a distinction between the objective and subjective conditions of limitation/restriction of fundamental rights/freedoms, each of which shall be subject to a separate test in order to determine whether limitations/restrictions thus established are justified. However, we reveal the way in which such principle has been accepted in the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, of the European Court of Justice and of the Constitutional Court of Romania, indicating the variations achieved in their case-law. As concerns the acceptance manner of the principle of proportionality in the case-law of the Constitutional Court of Romania, we analyze the fundamental differences between the classic principle of proportionality, which intrinsically characterizes the relative fundamental rights/freedoms, and the principle of proportionality covered by Article 53 of the Constitution. Likewise, the focus is on the analysis of subjective conditions of limitation of fundamental rights/freedoms in the light of the proportionality test conducted by the Constitutional Court of Romania and on the need for a precise constitutional review in order to avoid the development of distorted forms of implementation of this principle


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