What Independent Directors Should Expect from Inside Directors: Smith v. Van Gorkom as a Guide to Intra-Firm Governance

Author(s):  
Cheryl Lyn Wade
2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 669-703 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nadia Loukil ◽  
Ouidad Yousfi ◽  
Raissa Yerbanga

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the gender diversity on boards and its effect on stock market liquidity in French boardrooms. Design/methodology/approach Using a sample of French firms between 2002 and 2012 listed on the Paris Stock Exchange (SBF120), the study uses ordinary least squares and three-stage least squares (3SLS) regressions to address endogeneity concerns on the board gender diversity. Findings The results show that stock market liquidity is positively and significantly associated with the presence of women directors. The authors find that investors’ decisions vary according to their positions in the board: women independent members decrease illiquidity costs, while the presence of female inside directors increases daily trading volume. In addition, the presence of female inside directors increases the firm’s ability to implement better strategies that cope with economic, social and environmental constraints which leads investors to positively react. Surprisingly, the presence of female independent directors reduces company involvement in sustainable development projects. Practical implications The empirical findings contribute to the current debate on the benefits of gender diversity on corporate boards and the effectiveness of gender-quota laws. It shows that appointing insider female’ directors incite investors to trade more stocks while appointing independents ones reduces their trading costs. Social implications This paper shows that the benefits of female directors appointing depend on their independence of management team. Originality/value This study addresses the endogeneity between stock market liquidity, corporate governance and gender diversity. It is the first study to distinguish between the effects of women inside and independent directors on investors’ trading decisions.


Author(s):  
Fivi Anggraini

Earnings management is the moral hazard problem of manager that adses because of the conflict of interest between the manager as agent and the stakeholder and the owner as principal. The behavior of earnings management will immediately influence the reported earning. The aims of this research at examining the relationship of board and audit committe to earnings management. The samples of this research is all of companies member Corporate Governance Perception Index (CGPI) in the years of 2003-2006 which were listed in Jakarta Stock Exchange. The results of this study show that (1) the proportion of independent directors on the board had not significant relationship to earning management, (2) competence of independent directors on the board had not significant relationship to earning management, (3) the size of board had significant relationship to earning management, (4) the proportion of independent directors on the audit committe had not significant relationship to earning management, and (5) competence of members of the audit committe had significant relationship to earning management.


2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lauren Cohen ◽  
Andrea Frazzini ◽  
Christopher J. Malloy

Author(s):  
Ronald W. Masulis ◽  
Christian A. Ruzzier ◽  
Sheng Xiao ◽  
Shan Zhao

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document