Levels of Asset Specificity in Relational Contracting

2007 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian A. Ruzzier
Keyword(s):  
Asset Specificity ◽  
Relational Contracting

ASSET SPECIFICITY AND CHANNEL INTEGRATION

2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1436-1440
Author(s):  
Hidesuke Takata ◽  
◽  
Mark E. Parry
Keyword(s):  
Asset Specificity ◽  
Channel Integration

scholarly journals Asset Specificity and the Secondary Market for Productive Assets

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simone Boccaletti
Keyword(s):  
Theoretical Model ◽  
Financial Distress ◽  
Financial Constraints ◽  
Secondary Market ◽  
Asset Specificity ◽  
Cost Of Debt ◽  
Debt Contracts ◽  
Trade Off ◽  
Distressed Firms ◽  
Productive Assets

AbstractThe aim of this paper is to explore how debt contracts are affected by investment in asset specialization and by the dynamics of the secondary market for collateralized productive assets. Before applying for a loan, financially constrained firms face a specificity trade-off: asset specialization increases firms’ project returns, but decreases the liquidation value of assets in the secondary market if the firm is in financial distress. To study this trade-off, the paper uses a theoretical model in which the choice of asset specificity and the outcome of the secondary market for distressed firms’ assets are endogenous. High redeployability costs and a small number of participants in the secondary market are associated to low recovery values and to a high cost of debt. The paper shows the conditions under which financial constraints reduce firms’ incentive to invest in asset specificity.

scholarly journals Endogenous Verifiability and Relational Contracting

2009 ◽  
Vol 99 (5) ◽  
pp. 2193-2208 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ola Kvaløy ◽  
Trond E. Olsen
Keyword(s):  
Principal Agent ◽  
Relational Contracting ◽  
Strong Assumption ◽  
Repeated Interaction ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
Contractual Incompleteness ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Principal Agent Relationship

Principal-agent models usually invoke the strong assumption that the parties know for sure ex ante whether a variable is verifiable or not. This paper assumes that only the probability of verification is known, and that this probability is endogenously determined. We analyze a principal-agent relationship where the verifiability of the agent's output is determined by the principal's investment in drafting an explicit contract. The model is well suited for analyzing the relationship between explicit contracting, legal courts, trust, and relational contracting. In particular, we show how trust—established through repeated interaction—and legal courts may induce contractual incompleteness. (JEL D82, D86)

From Protectionism to Regionalism: Multinational Firms and Trade-Related Investment Measures

2004 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-36 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kerry A. Chase
Keyword(s):  
Free Trade Agreement ◽  
Multinational Firms ◽  
Trade Agreement ◽  
Theoretical Work ◽  
Sunk Costs ◽  
Asset Specificity ◽  
The Political ◽  
Multilateral Trade ◽  
Commitment Problems

Trade-related investment measures (TRIMs) have been a key issue in regional and multilateral trade negotiations, but they have received little attention in theoretical work to date. This article analyzes the political economy of TRIMs to illuminate why regional arrangements have been a popular framework for eliminating them. The main argument is that multinational firms often demand safeguards when TRIMs are being liberalized, particularly if they have large sunk costs due to asset specificity. In general, regional arrangements are better equipped than multilateral rules to incorporate the safeguards these firms demand: regionalism requires governments to make binding commitments, and it creates opportunities to discriminate against outsiders. A case study of lobbying by U.S. companies with FDI in Canada from the early twentieth century to the negotiation of the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement illustrates these points. The article concludes that regional arrangements are likely to remain more active, and more successful, than multilateral discussions in managing the commitment problems inherent in liberalizing TRIMs.

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