Managers Discretionary Behaviour, Earnings Management and Internal Mechanisms of Corporate Governance: Empirical Evidence from Chilean Firms

2005 ◽  
Author(s):  
Félix J. López-Iturriaga ◽  
Paolo Saona
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Empirical Evidence

scholarly journals A meta-analysis of the association between earnings management and audit quality and audit committee effectiveness

2008 ◽  
Vol 6 (Special Issue 1) ◽  
pp. 48-56
Author(s):  
Mark I. Hwang ◽  
Jerry W. Lin
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Meta Analysis ◽  
Important Research ◽  
Analysis Techniques ◽  
Research Stream

Earnings management is of great concern to corporate stakeholders. While numerous studies have investigated various determinants of earnings management relating to corporate governance and audit quality, empirical evidence on their effects is rather inconsistent. Employing meta-analysis techniques, this research integrates and evaluates results from 27 prior studies. All eleven variables examined show a significant effect on earnings management. Researchers are encouraged to build on our results to continue this important research stream.

scholarly journals Earnings management and internal mechanisms of corporate governance: Empirical evidence from Chilean firms

2005 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 17-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
Félix J. López-Iturriaga ◽  
Paolo Saona Hoffmann
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Capital Structure ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Institutional Investor ◽  
Ownership Concentration ◽  
Discretionary Power ◽  
Abnormal Accruals ◽  
Discretionary Behavior

We analyze the ability of the capital structure and the ownership structure as mechanisms of control of the managers of the firms and to reduce their accounting discretionary power for a sample of Chilean firms. Using earnings management and abnormal accruals as indicators of discretionary behavior, our results show that both debt and ownership concentration reduce the managers’ discretionary behavior, so we corroborate the outstanding role both mechanisms play in a country with low protection of investors’ rights. At the same time, we find that earnings management is fostered by institutional investor ownership

Corporate Governance and Earnings Management: Empirical Evidence of the Distress and Non-Distress Companies

2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 23-30
Author(s):  
Theresia Theresia ◽  
Dewi Kurnia Indrastuti ◽  
Nico Alexander
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Financial Distress ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Institutional Ownership ◽  
Manufacturing Companies ◽  
Negative Effect

Objective - The purpose of this research is to obtain empirical research on the effect of corporate governance on earnings management in distressed and non-distressed companies. Corporate governance in this research is measured by independent board, audit committee, board of commissioners, institutional ownership and number of board commissioner meetings. The research predicts that corporate governance has a negative effect on earnings management either both in distressed and non-distressed companies. Methodology/Technique - This research uses 309 manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange and the data was obtained using purposive sampling method during 2016 until 2018. Of the 309 respondents in the sample, 287 are distressed companies and 22 are non-distressed companies. The data was analyzed using a multiple regression method. Findings - The empirical results show that commissioner board and institutional ownership have a negative effect on earnings management in non-distressed companies but in distressed companies, corporate governance does not have an effect on earnings management. This research shows that distressed companies, corporate governance cannot minimize earnings management practices because to maintain the company as a going concern, management will do earnings management to ensure stakeholders’ trust to encourage further investment in the company. In non-distressed companies, corporate governance can minimize earnings management practices because the company is in a good financial condition, so they don’t need to do earnings management. Additionally, in order to ensure stakeholders’ trust, the company will strengthen its’ corporate governance mechanisms. Type of Paper: Empirical. JEL Classification: M41, M43, G34, J33, K22. Keywords: Financial Distress; Earnings Management; Non-Financial Distress; Indonesia Stock Exchange. Reference to this paper should be made as follows: Theresia; Indrastuti, D. K; Alexander, N. (2021). Corporate Governance and Earnings Management: Empirical Evidence of the Distress and Non-Distress Companies, Accounting and Finance Review, 5(4): 23 – 30. https://doi.org/10.35609/afr.2021.5.4(3)

Special Purpose Vehicles: Empirical Evidence on Determinants and Earnings Management

2009 ◽  
Vol 84 (6) ◽  
pp. 1833-1876 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mei Feng ◽  
Jeffrey D. Gramlich ◽  
Sanjay Gupta
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Cross Section ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Monotonic Increase ◽  
Reporting Incentives ◽  
Broad Cross Section ◽  
Set Up ◽  
Over Time

ABSTRACT: We investigate the use, determinants, and earnings effects of special purpose vehicles (SPVs). Based on a proxy of SPV activity that can be applied to a broad cross-section of firms over time, we find a two-and-a-half fold monotonic increase in the percentage of firms using at least one SPV during the eight-year period from 1997 through 2004. Tobit regressions of the determinants of SPV use show that SPV activity increases with financial reporting incentives and economic and tax motivations, but strong corporate governance tends to mitigate their use. In addition, the evidence is consistent with SPVs arranged for financial reporting purposes being associated with earnings management, whereas the same does not appear to be the case for SPVs set up mainly for economic, tax, and other reasons.

scholarly journals The association between corporate governance and earnings management: The role of independent directors

2006 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 65-75 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Benkel ◽  
Paul R. Mather ◽  
Alan Ramsay
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Independent Directors ◽  
Corporate Governance Codes ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
The Relationship

The agency perspective of corporate governance emphasizes the monitoring role of the board of directors. This study is concerned with analyzing whether independent directors on the board and audit committee (recommendations of the ASX Corporate Governance Council, 2003) are associated with reduced levels of earnings management. The results support the hypotheses that a higher proportion of independent directors on the board and on the audit committee are associated with reduced levels of earnings management. The results are robust to alternative specifications of the model. This study adds to the very limited research into the relationship between corporate governance and earnings management in Australia. It also provides empirical evidence on the effectiveness of some of the regulators’ recommendations, which may be of value to regulators in preparing and amending corporate governance codes

scholarly journals Good Corporate Governance Memoderasi Pengaruh Earnings Management dan Likuiditas pada Kualitas Laba

2021 ◽  
Vol 31 (8) ◽  
pp. 2041
Author(s):  
I Ketut Mandi Wira Putra ◽  
Anak Agung Gde Putu Widanaputra
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Regression Analysis ◽  
Data Analysis ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Earnings Quality ◽  
Purposive Sampling ◽  
Good Corporate Governance ◽  
The Relationship

The purpose of this study is to obtain empirical evidence on the effect of earnings management and liquidity on earnings quality, with good corporate governance serving as a moderating variable, in companies ranked by the Corporate Governance Perception Index (CGPI). This study employs the associative method, with data gathered from non-participant observations. Purposive sampling was used to determine the sample, and 35 firm-year were obtained during the study period. The Moderated Regression Analysis (MRA) technique was used for data analysis. According to the findings, good corporate governance modifies the relationship between earnings management and earnings quality. Furthermore, according to the findings of this study, good corporate governance has no effect on the relationship between liquidity and earnings quality. Keywords: Earnings Management; Liquidity; Earnings Quality; Good Corporate Governance.

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