Social Games: Matching and the Play of Finitely Repeated Games

Social games: Matching and the play of finitely repeated games

Games and Economic Behavior ◽

10.1016/j.geb.2008.02.004 ◽

2010 ◽

Vol 70 (1) ◽

pp. 170-191 ◽

Cited By ~ 19

Author(s):

Matthew O. Jackson ◽

Alison Watts

Keyword(s):

Repeated Games ◽

Social Games ◽

Finitely Repeated Games

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Strategic absentmindedness in finitely repeated games

Top ◽

10.1007/s11750-009-0086-3 ◽

2009 ◽

Vol 17 (1) ◽

pp. 85-95

Author(s):

Ignacio García-Jurado ◽

Natividad Llorca ◽

Ana Meca ◽

Manuel A. Pulido ◽

Joaquín Sánchez-Soriano

Keyword(s):

Repeated Games ◽

Finitely Repeated Games

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Cooperation between Emotional Players

Games ◽

10.3390/g11040045 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 11 (4) ◽

pp. 45

Author(s):

Lina Andersson

Keyword(s):

Repeated Games ◽

Stochastic Games ◽

The State ◽

The Other ◽

States Of Mind ◽

Finitely Repeated Games ◽

Prisoners Dilemma ◽

State Of Mind ◽

Infinitely Repeated Games

This paper uses the framework of stochastic games to propose a model of emotions in repeated interactions. An emotional player can be in either a friendly, a neutral, or a hostile state of mind. The player transitions between the states of mind as a response to observed actions taken by the other player. The state of mind determines the player’s psychological payoff which together with a material payoff constitutes the player’s utility. In the friendly (hostile) state of mind the player has a positive (negative) concern for other players’ material payoffs. This paper shows how emotions can both facilitate and obstruct cooperation in a repeated prisoners’ dilemma game. In finitely repeated games a player who cares only for their own material payoffs can have an incentive to manipulate an emotional player into the friendly state of mind. In infinitely repeated games with two emotional players less patience is required to sustain cooperation. However, emotions can also obstruct cooperation if they make the players unwilling to punish each other, or if the players become hostile when punished.

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Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring

SSRN Electronic Journal ◽

10.2139/ssrn.267787 ◽

2001 ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

George J. Mailath ◽

Steven A. Matthews ◽

Tadashi Sekiguchi

Keyword(s):

Repeated Games ◽

Finitely Repeated Games ◽

Public Monitoring

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Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring

Contributions in Theoretical Economics ◽

10.2202/1534-5971.1046 ◽

2002 ◽

Vol 2 (1) ◽

Cited By ~ 16

Author(s):

George J. Mailath ◽

Steven A. Matthews ◽

Tadashi Sekiguchi

Keyword(s):

Nash Equilibrium ◽

Repeated Games ◽

Finitely Repeated Games ◽

Game Equilibrium ◽

Public Signals ◽

Stage Game ◽

Public Monitoring ◽

Public Signal ◽

Action Profile

We present three examples of finitely repeated games with public monitoring that have sequential equilibria in private strategies, i.e., strategies that depend on own past actions as well as public signals. Such private sequential equilibria can have features quite unlike those of the more familiar perfect public equilibria: (i) making a public signal less informative can create Pareto superior equilibrium outcomes; (ii) the equilibrium final-period action profile need not be a stage game equilibrium; and (iii) even if the stage game has a unique correlated (and hence Nash) equilibrium, the first-period action profile need not be a stage game equilibrium.

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