Asset Substitution and Debt Renegotiation

2005 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Riis Flor
2009 ◽  
Vol 84 (3) ◽  
pp. 689-712 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katrin Burkhardt ◽  
Roland Strausz

ABSTRACT: We develop a model to show that transparent accounting can worsen the asset substitution effect of debt. This negative effect can outweigh the usual positive effect of transparency. We demonstrate this point by comparing pure historical cost accounting to the conservatively skewed accounting regime of lower-of-cost-or-market (LCM). In a market with asymmetric information, the two regimes lead to different degrees of transparency. The more transparent LCM regime produces more efficient results for firms with lower debt levels, while the opaque rule of pure historical cost accounting is preferable for higher debt levels. We explore the implications of this result for the firm's optimal capital structure.


2016 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 197-229 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip Valta

AbstractThis paper theoretically and empirically investigates how debt structure and strategic interaction among shareholders and debt holders in the event of default affect expected stock returns. The model predicts that expected stock returns are higher for firms that face high debt renegotiation difficulties and that have a large fraction of secured or convertible debt. Using a large sample of publicly traded U.S. firms for the period 1985–2012, the paper presents new evidence on the link between debt structure and stock returns that is supportive of the model’s predictions.


2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Santiago Caicedo ◽  
David Perez-Reyna
Keyword(s):  

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