Family Ownership and Performance: The Net Effect of Productive Efficiency and Growth Constraints

2005 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carmen Galve Górriz ◽  
Vincente Salas Fumás
Keyword(s):  
Productive Efficiency ◽  
Family Ownership ◽  
Growth Constraints ◽  
And Performance

Family ownership

2020 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 241-257 ◽  
Author(s):  
Belén Villalonga ◽  
Raphael Amit
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Family Ownership ◽  
Corporate Ownership ◽  
Firm Behaviour ◽  
The World ◽  
And Performance ◽  
Prevalent Form

Abstract This article reviews the existing literature about the most prevalent form of corporate ownership around the world: ownership by individuals—particularly founders—and families. We summarize the existing evidence about the prevalence and persistence of family ownership around the world, along with its impact on performance—both financial and non-financial—relative to other types of corporate ownership. We discuss how and why these empirical facts and findings come about—why owners in general, and family owners in particular, are critical drivers of firm behaviour and performance, and how they are able to exercise their influence over corporations in which other shareholders, such as institutional investors, and other stakeholders can also play an important role.

Family firms, family generation and performance: evidence from an emerging economy

2014 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 197-219 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohammad Badrul Muttakin ◽  
Arifur Khan ◽  
Nava Subramaniam
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Emerging Market ◽  
Emerging Economy ◽  
Family Ownership ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Generation Family ◽  
And Performance ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Better Than

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of family ownership on firm performance. In particular the authors investigate whether family firms outperform non-family firms and whether first generation family firms perform better than second generation family firms in an emerging economy using Bangladesh as a case. Design/methodology/approach – This study uses a data set of 141 listed Bangladeshi non-financial companies for the period 2005-2009. The methodology is based on multivariate regression analysis. Findings – The result shows that family firms perform better than their non-family counterparts. The authors also find that family ownership has a positive impact on firm performance. The analysis further reveals intergenerational differences where family firms and performance are associated positively only when founder members act as CEOs or chairmen. However, when descendents serve as CEOs or chairmen family firms are associated with poorer firm performance. Originality/value – The authors extend the findings of previous studies that investigate the family ownership and firm performance relationship in developed economy settings, but neglected emerging economies. The study also informs the literature about the intergenerational impact of family firms on performance in an emerging market.

scholarly journals Family ownership, premiums paid and performance: Evidence from corporate take-overs in Malaysia

2007 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 89-99 ◽  
Author(s):  
Saw-Imm Song ◽  
Ruhani Ali ◽  
Subramaniam Pillay
Keyword(s):  
Interaction Effect ◽  
Agency Problem ◽  
Developed Countries ◽  
Curvilinear Relationship ◽  
Family Ownership ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
And Performance ◽  
The Relationship

This study examines the relationship between ownership identity of the largest shareholders, premiums paid and take-over performance, with reference to 63 large acquisitions by Malaysian public listed firms from 1990 to 1999. It is found that the premiums paid are much higher than those in developed countries. It has a curvilinear relationship with take-over performance. At lower to moderate levels of premiums, it improves post-take-over performance while excessive premium drags down the performance of the bidding firms. The finding shows that there is an interaction effect between family ownership and premiums paid which has contributed positively to the post-take-over performance. The evidence suggests that family ownership mitigates agency problem in corporate take-overs

scholarly journals Agency costs, corporate governance mechanisms and performance of public listed family firms in Malaysia

2011 ◽  
Vol 42 (3) ◽  
pp. 17-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. Ibrahim ◽  
F. A. Samad
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Firm Value ◽  
Agency Costs ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Family Ownership ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Utilization Ratio ◽  
And Performance

We compare corporate governance and performance between family and non-family ownership of public listed companies in Malaysia from 1999 through 2005 measured by Tobin’s Q and ROA. We also examine the governance mechanisms as a tool in monitoring agency costs based on asset utilization ratio and expense ratio as proxy for agency costs. We find that on average firm value is lower in family firms than non-family firms, while board size, independent director and duality have a significant impact on firm performance in family firms as compared to non-family firms. We also find that these governance mechanisms have significant impact on agency costs for both family and non-family firms.

Should the CEO Also Be Chair of the Board? An Empirical Examination of Family-Controlled Public Firms

2007 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 111-126 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Braun ◽  
Anurag Sharma
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Family Ownership ◽  
Stewardship Theory ◽  
Empirical Examination ◽  
Shareholder Returns ◽  
Ceo Duality ◽  
Board Chair ◽  
Public Firms ◽  
And Performance ◽  
The Relationship

Using the competing agency theoretic and stewardship theory perspectives, we empirically examine the relationship between CEO duality and firm performance in family-controlled public firms (FCPFs). We find that duality by itself does not influence firm performance in FCPFs. However, our results show that the relationship between duality and performance is contingent on the family's ownership stake in the firm. In nondual firms, performance is inversely related to family ownership level. Dual FCPFs do not exhibit any changes in performance dependent on family ownership levels. Our findings reveal, in short, that when family ownership is low, the separation of CEO and board chair roles is beneficial in terms of shareholder returns. Having different persons occupy the CEO and board chair positions is a useful governance control as the risk of family entrenchment increases.

scholarly journals THE EFFECT OF FAMILY OWNERSHIP ON PROFIT AND PERFORMANCE COMPANY MANAGEMENT: BASED ON THE THEORY OF STEWARDSHIP

2018 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 336-352
Author(s):  
Wuryan Andayani ◽  
◽  
Jogiyanto Hartono ◽  
Supriyadi Supriyadi ◽  
Setiyono Miharjo ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Family Ownership ◽  
And Performance
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