Disappearing Defendants v. Judgment Proof Injurers: Upgrading the Theory of Tort Law Failures

Getting Even: The Role of the Victim

Social Philosophy and Policy ◽

10.1017/s0265052500000832 ◽

1990 ◽

Vol 7 (2) ◽

pp. 209-225 ◽

Cited By ~ 8

Author(s):

Jeffrie G. Murphy

Keyword(s):

Rule Of Law ◽

Tort Law ◽

Crime Victims ◽

The State ◽

Financial Compensation ◽

The Rule Of Law ◽

American System ◽

Compensation Package ◽

Judgment Proof

Achilles is vindictive; he wants to get even with Agamemnon. Being so disposed, he sounds rather like many current crime victims who angrily complain that the American system of criminal justice will not allow them the satisfactions they rightfully seek. These victims often feel that their particular injuries are ignored while the system addresses itself to some abstract injury to the state or to the rule of law itself – a focus that appears to result in wrongdoers being treated with much greater solicitation and respect than their victims receive. If the actual victims are noticed at all (other than to alert the state to a violation of its interests), they will likely be told that there is another branch of law – tort law – that has the job of dealing with private injuries and grievances and that, if they pursue this route at their own expense, they might ultimately get some financial compensation for the wrongs done to them. However, just as Achilles felt that mere compensation was inadequate to the kind of injury done to him by Agamemnon, many of these victims will often claim that the injuries they have suffered (brutal rape, perhaps) do not admit of financial compensation. How, they might ask, can a dollar value be set on the humiliation and degradation they have experienced? They might also note that those who injure them tend, unlike Agamemnon, to be judgment-proof – so lacking in resources as to be unable to make any meaningful contribution to any compensation package that the victim may win.

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Autonomous Artificial Intelligence and Uncontemplated Hazards: Towards the Optimal Regulatory Framework

European Journal of Risk Regulation ◽

10.1017/err.2021.28 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 1-20

Author(s):

Mitja KOVAC

Keyword(s):

Artificial Intelligence ◽

Industrial Revolution ◽

Tort Law ◽

Regulatory Framework ◽

Social Consequences ◽

Safety Regulation ◽

Legal Personality ◽

Ex Ante ◽

Judgment Proof ◽

Regulatory Intervention

The issue of super-intelligent artificial intelligence (AI) has begun to attract ever more attention in economics, law, sociology and philosophy studies. A new industrial revolution is being unleashed, and it is vital that lawmakers address the systemic challenges it is bringing while regulating its economic and social consequences. This paper sets out recommendations to ensure informed regulatory intervention covering potential uncontemplated AI-related risks. If AI evolves in ways unintended by its designers, the judgment-proof problem of existing legal persons engaged with AI might undermine the deterrence and insurance goals of classic tort law, which consequently might fail to ensure optimal risk internalisation and precaution. This paper also argues that, due to identified shortcomings, the debate on the different approaches to controlling hazardous activities boils down to a question of efficient ex ante safety regulation. In addition, it is suggested that it is better to place AI in the existing legal categories and not to create a new electronic legal personality.

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