Does Local Market Correlation Matter for Ownership Structure and Control Rights?

2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruno Maria Parigi ◽  
Loriana Pelizzon
Keyword(s):  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Local Market ◽  
Control Rights ◽  
And Control

scholarly journals Corporate ownership and control: New evidence from Taiwan

2003 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-101 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yin-Hua Yeh
Keyword(s):  
Cash Flow ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Empirical Literature ◽  
Corporate Ownership ◽  
Control Rights ◽  
Controlling Shareholders ◽  
Control Power ◽  
Management Participation ◽  
Cash Flow Rights ◽  
And Control

Recent empirical literature on corporate governance has demonstrated that companies’ shares are generally concentrated in the hands of particular families or wealthy investors. Claessens et al. (2002) analyzed the ownership structure in East Asian eight countries, but misestimated the Taiwanese condition that made them not find the positive incentive or negative entrenchment effects in Taiwan. This study tries to clear the ultimate control in Taiwan, use the detailed data to better understand the ownership structure in Taiwan and investigates the determinants for deviation of control from cash flow rights. Based on the findings, the companies’ shares are common concentrated in the hands of the largest shareholder. We find that the deviation of control from cash flow rights is greater in the family-controlled companies than other type companies. Also the controlling shareholders use more pyramids and cross shareholding to increase their control rights that accompanies with deeply management participation. On the average, the controlling shareholders hold more than half board seats and usually occupy the chairman and general manger to enhance their control power in family-controlled companies. No matter in all sample or family-controlled companies, the controlling shareholders owns significantly less cash flow rights, occupy more board seats in deviation group companies than those without deviation. Corporate valuation is significantly lower in the companies with the divergence of control from cash flow rights than non-deviation companies.

scholarly journals Does pyramiding have an impact on firm’s capital structure decision among Malaysian distress companies?

2005 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 93-106 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fauzias Mat Nor ◽  
Amin Noordin Bany-Ariffin
Keyword(s):  
Capital Structure ◽  
Cash Flow ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Direct Result ◽  
Control Rights ◽  
Financing Decisions ◽  
Pyramidal Ownership ◽  
Cash Flow Rights ◽  
And Control ◽  
The Impact

It is documented by La Porta, Lopez and Shleifer (1999) that ultimate owners around the world usually control an array of affiliated companies through hierarchical intermediary corporations forming pyramidal holdings. A direct result of this pyramidal ownership structure is divergence of cash flow rights from control rights in the hand of the largest shareholders (Claessens, Djankov and Lang 2000). This paper investigates the impact of this separation of cash flow rights from control rights resulting from these pyramidal forms of ownership structure on firm’s capital structure. In particular, our objective is to examine whether such separation affects the financing decisions among Malaysian listed distressed companies. Even though it is not conclusive our findings somewhat lend support to the leverage-increasing non-dilution entrenchment effect on corporate leverage, whereby the separation of cash flow rights and control rights leads to the increase of leverage among the distressed companies. Consequently, excessive use of leverage in order to protect ultimate owner’s dominance in these companies then leads to disastrous financial valuation.

East Asia’s retail revolution: Diffusion of organized retailing and varieties of market development in Korea and Taiwan

2020 ◽  
Vol 24 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 358-387
Author(s):  
Solee Shin
Keyword(s):  
Local Market ◽  
Local Policy ◽  
Retail Development ◽  
Competition And Cooperation ◽  
Economic Diversity ◽  
National Economic ◽  
Comparative Capitalism ◽  
Global Diffusion ◽  
Consumer Tastes ◽  
And Control

Global diffusion of organized retailing over the last several decades brought extensive worldwide standardization of retail formats and technologies. Such development, however, has not led to the success of the same set of retailers but to varied prominence of core players across markets. Few studies comparatively analyse local market environments to assess this variation, and those that do rarely look beyond local policy measures or idiosyncratic consumer tastes. Presenting a sociological institutionalist alternative and comparing Korea’s and Taiwan’s paths to organized retail development, this article highlights how local business groups relied on network-hierarchy logics to coordinate and control new businesses amid MNC entry and global diffusion of retailing. The resulting dynamics of competition and cooperation illustrate the significance of institutionalized market environments for MNC performance. The study contributes to the comparative capitalism literature by highlighting institutionally embedded strategic behaviours of organizations as crucial contributors to continued national economic diversity amid heightening globalization.

scholarly journals Evolution of ownership and control in Italian IPO firms

2008 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 312-333 ◽  
Author(s):  
Silvia Rigamonti
Keyword(s):  
Cash Flow ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Voting Rights ◽  
Set Up ◽  
Cash Flow Rights ◽  
And Control

This article examines the evolution of ownership of cash flow rights and control of voting rights of firms that went public in Italy over the period 1985-2005. At the IPO, the ownership structure does not evolve towards a dispersed one. Even 10 years after the flotation, the initial ultimate shareholder retains the majority of voting rights. Though control is valuable, original owners do not systematically set up structures that dissociate cash flow from voting rights.

scholarly journals Effects of Deregulation and Consolidation of the Broadcast Television Industry

2016 ◽  
Vol 106 (8) ◽  
pp. 2185-2218 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jessica Calfee Stahl
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Cost Savings ◽  
Local Market ◽  
Significant Cost ◽  
Television Industry ◽  
Broadcast Television ◽  
Joint Ownership ◽  
Market Consolidation

This paper exploits deregulation in the 1990s to estimate viewership and revenue effects of consolidation in broadcast television, then finds cost effects that explain the ownership structure given viewership and revenue effects. Results suggest that consolidation greatly increased profitability in an industry with otherwise declining profitability. Groups with broader national coverage attract more advertising per station. Joint ownership of two stations within a market and network ownership both allow for significant cost savings. There is some evidence that within-market consolidation allows stations to achieve local market power. However, both within-market and across-market consolidation appear to have boosted viewership, on net. (JEL G32, L13, L25, L51, L82, L88)

scholarly journals Research and the Approval Process: The Organization of Persuasion

2019 ◽  
Vol 109 (3) ◽  
pp. 911-955 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emeric Henry ◽  
Marco Ottaviani
Keyword(s):  
Information Acquisition ◽  
Drug Approval ◽  
Regulatory Process ◽  
Approval Process ◽  
Control Rights ◽  
Classic Solution ◽  
Organizational Rules ◽  
And Control ◽  
Normative Perspective

An informer sequentially collects and disseminates information through costly research to persuade an evaluator to approve an activity. Payoffs and control rights are split between informer and evaluator depending on the organizational rules governing the approval process. The welfare benchmark corresponds to Wald’s classic solution for a statistician with payoff equal to the sum of informer and evaluator. Organizations with different commitment power of informer and evaluator are compared from a positive and normative perspective. Granting authority to the informer is socially optimal when information acquisition is sufficiently costly. The analysis is applied to the regulatory process for drug approval. (JEL D82, D83, I18, L51, L65, O31)

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