scholarly journals Does Trade Liberalization Always Decrease Union Bargaining Power?

2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jorge Arbache
Keyword(s):  
Trade Liberalization ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Union Bargaining Power

scholarly journals Inequality between capital and labour and among wage-earners: the role of collective bargaining and trade unions

2021 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-46
Author(s):  
Maarten Keune
Keyword(s):  
Collective Bargaining ◽  
Wage Inequality ◽  
Trade Unions ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Union Density ◽  
General Terms ◽  
Union Bargaining Power ◽  
Wage Earners ◽  
The Relationship

In the context of rising inequality between capital and labour and among wage-earners in Europe, this state-of-the-art article reviews the literature concerning the relationship between collective bargaining and inequality. It focuses on two main questions: (i) what is the relationship between collective bargaining, union bargaining power and inequality between capital and labour? and (ii) what is the relationship between collective bargaining, union bargaining power and wage inequality among wage-earners? Both questions are discussed in general terms and for single- and multi-employer bargaining systems. It is argued that collective bargaining coverage and union density are negatively related to both types of inequality. These relationships are however qualified by four additional factors: who unions represent, the weight of union objectives other than wages, the statutory minimum wage, and extensions of collective agreements by governments.

Cost-of-Living Clauses in Union Contracts: Determinants and Effects

ILR Review ◽  
1983 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 447-460 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wallace E. Hendricks ◽  
Lawrence M. Kahn
Keyword(s):  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Cost Of Living ◽  
Inflation Uncertainty ◽  
Wage Inflation ◽  
Union Bargaining Power ◽  
Unanticipated Inflation

This study investigates, for the period 1969–81, the determinants of the incidence and strength of cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) clauses in U.S. manufacturing and the effect of those clauses on wage inflation. The sample includes approximately 5,570 union contracts in over 2,600 bargaining relationships. The authors find that both union bargaining power and inflation uncertainty positively affected the probability that a COLA clause was adopted as well as the strength of the clause adopted. Negatively influencing the incidence and strength of COLA clauses during the period studied were unanticipated changes in an industry's prices. The authors also find evidence that wage inflation was greater under contracts with uncapped COLAs than under all other contracts, a result that also was positively influenced by the amount of unanticipated inflation. From these results, the authors suggest a number of possible trends in the use and effects of COLA clauses.

FDI and Privatization

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yi-min Lin
Keyword(s):  
Trade Liberalization ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Economic Hardship ◽  
Local State ◽  
Political Leaders ◽  
Foreign Investors ◽  
Important Resource ◽  
Local Officials ◽  
Focal Issue

Chapter 6 extends the analysis of local state actions to the privatization function of FDI. The focal issue is how and why foreign investors were able to overcome centrally imposed regulatory and policy constraints on their entry, expansion, and organization before trade liberalization associated with China’s WTO accession in 2001. Again, rule bending by local governments was the centerpiece of the story. As in the case of locales experiencing early privatization, local officials took calculated political risk by using economic hardship and the benefits of FDI for addressing revenue and employment imperatives as justifications. The extent of their deviations from centrally set boundaries nevertheless varied, depending greatly on the bargaining power of local political leaders vis-à-vis their supervising authorities. In particular, whether a locale was perceived as a major fiscal burden or an important resource contributor to higher-level authorities was an important differentiating factor.

Union Bargaining Power in the Coal Industry, 1945–1981

ILR Review ◽  
1983 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 214-229 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Navarro
Keyword(s):  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Coal Industry ◽  
Postwar Period ◽  
Union Power ◽  
Sharp Decline ◽  
Coal Consumption ◽  
Union Leadership ◽  
Rule Changes ◽  
Union Bargaining Power ◽  
Bargaining Table

In examining the bargaining record of the coal industry since the mid-19405, this paper demonstrates that union power in this industry has fluctuated considerably over the years and then describes the reasons for that fluctuation. The author argues that the level of coal consumption has had a consistently strong effect on the balance of bargaining power throughout the postwar period and that industry profits have also influenced settlements, but to a lesser extent. In recent negotiations, the most important power factor has been the sharp decline in the percentage of coal produced by mines covered by UMW contracts. In addition, not only has pre-strike stockpiling by major consumers blunted the union's strike weapon, but also the weakness of union leadership in recent years has helped to precipitate and prolong strikes. Only the evidence on the union's democratic contract ratification procedure, adopted in 1973, is mixed: although providing a slight strategic advantage to the union on occasion, it has also led to confusion at the bargaining table and contributed to the weakness of the leadership. The author also illustrates the importance of including rule changes in measuring union power.

scholarly journals Optimal Design of Trade Agreements in the Presence of Renegotiation

2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 109-143 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giovanni Maggi ◽  
Robert W. Staiger
Keyword(s):  
Optimal Design ◽  
Trade Liberalization ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Law And Economics ◽  
Trade Agreements ◽  
Optimal Contract ◽  
Liability Rule ◽  
Optimal Property ◽  
High Uncertainty ◽  
Property Rule

We study the optimal design of trade agreements when governments can renegotiate after the resolution of uncertainty but compensation between them is inefficient. In equilibrium, renegotiation always results in trade liberalization, not protection. The optimal contract may be a “property rule” or a “liability rule.” High uncertainty favors liability over property rules, while asymmetries in bargaining power favor property over liability rules. Moreover, optimal property rules are never renegotiated. With a cost of renegotiation, property rules are favored when this cost is higher, reversing a central conclusion of the law-and-economics literature. (JEL C78, D86, F13, F15, K12)

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