Social Learning and Norms in a Public Goods Experiment with Inter-Generational Advice

Author(s):  
Ananish Chaudhuri ◽  
Sara Graziano ◽  
Pushkar Maitra
2006 ◽  
Vol 73 (2) ◽  
pp. 357-380 ◽  
Author(s):  
ANANISH CHAUDHURI ◽  
SARA GRAZIANO ◽  
PUSHKAR MAITRA

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Priyodorshi Banerjee ◽  
Sujoy Chakravarty ◽  
Ruchika Mohanty

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Stefanos A. Tsikas

Abstract With a linear public goods game played in six different variants, this article studies two channels that might moderate social dilemmas and increase cooperation without using pecuniary incentives: moral framing and shaming. We find that cooperation is increased when noncontributing to a public good is framed as morally debatable and socially harmful tax avoidance, while the mere description of a tax context has no effect. However, without social sanctions in place, cooperation quickly deteriorates due to social contagion. We find ‘shaming’ free-riders by disclosing their misdemeanor to act as a strong social sanction, irrespective of the context in which it is applied. Moralizing tax avoidance significantly reinforces shaming, compared with a simple tax context.


2017 ◽  
Vol 284 (1853) ◽  
pp. 20170067 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maxwell N. Burton-Chellew ◽  
Claire El Mouden ◽  
Stuart A. West

Humans have a sophisticated ability to learn from others, termed social learning, which has allowed us to spread over the planet, construct complex societies, and travel to the moon. It has been hypothesized that social learning has played a pivotal role in making human societies cooperative, by favouring cooperation even when it is not favoured by genetical selection. However, this hypothesis lacks direct experimental testing, and the opposite prediction has also been made, that social learning disfavours cooperation. We experimentally tested how different aspects of social learning affect the level of cooperation in public-goods games. We found that: (i) social information never increased cooperation and usually led to decreased cooperation; (ii) cooperation was lowest when individuals could observe how successful individuals behaved; and (iii) cooperation declined because individuals preferred to copy successful individuals, who cooperated less, rather than copy common behaviours. Overall, these results suggest that individuals use social information to try and improve their own success, and that this can lead to lower levels of cooperation.


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