scholarly journals Dividend Policy, Agency Costs, and Earned Equity

2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harry DeAngelo ◽  
Linda DeAngelo ◽  
Ren� M. Stulz
Keyword(s):  
Agency Costs ◽  
Dividend Policy

scholarly journals Impact of Taxes and Agency Costs on Dividend Policy

2006 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 63-72 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pavel Kraus
Keyword(s):  
Agency Costs ◽  
Dividend Policy

scholarly journals Modelo de política óptima de dividendos

2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (20) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jorge Núñez Pérez ◽  
Juan Rositas Martínez ◽  
Manuel Medina Elizondo
Keyword(s):  
Information Content ◽  
Agency Costs ◽  
Dividend Policy ◽  
Binary Logistic Regression ◽  
Building Blocks ◽  
Agency Cost ◽  
General Context ◽  
Binary Logistic Regression Analysis ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
New Formulation

Keywords: agency costs, clienteles of dividends, information content of dividends, irrelevance of dividend policy, transaction costsAbstract. This research addresses one of the fundamental decisions of corporate finance: the dividend policy. It is formulated a model whose building blocks are the theory of irrelevance of the dividends of Modigliani and Miller (as a general context), the signaling model of John Lintner, and the model of Michael S. Rozzef of minimization of agency cost and transaction costs. The construction of the theoretical model of optimal dividend policy proposed here highlights the advantages of the axiomatic definition of the theory of Modigliani and Miller, by its logical contribution, and intends to propose a new formulation with respect to the determination of level of payment of dividends in the corporations. Therefore we relax the assumptions specified by Modigliani and Miller related to liquidity indifference, absence of uncertainty, agency costs and transaction cost, also we explore the possibility of presence of asymmetric information. In such circumstances, for the model exposed here and by means of a binary logistic regression analysis is tested the influence of profits, the information content of dividends, the clientele effect and agency costs to define policy dividends of the corporations in Mexico.Palabras clave: clientelas de dividendos, contenido informativo de los dividendos, costos de agencia, costos de transacción, irrelevancia de la política de dividendosResumen. Esta investigación aborda una de las decisiones fundamentales de las finanzas corporativas: la política de dividendos. Se formula un modelo cuyos bloques de construcción son la teoría de irrelevancia de los dividendos de Modigliani y Miller (como contexto general), el modelo de señalización de John Lintner, y el modelo de Michael S. Rozzef de minimización de costos de agencia y de costos de transacción. La construcción del modelo teórico de política óptima de dividendos aquí propuesto pone de relieve las ventajas de la definición axiomática de la teoría de Modigliani y Miller, en cuanto a contribución lógica, con la intención de acercarnos a una nueva formulación respecto de la determinación del nivel de pago de dividendos en las corporaciones. Para ello se relajan las suposiciones especificadas por Modigliani y Miller en relación a la indiferencia por liquidez, ausencia de incertidumbre, costos de agencia y costos de transacción, también se explora la posibilidad de presencia de información asimétrica. En dichas circunstancias, para el modelo aquí expuesto y mediante un análisis de regresión logística binaria se prueba la influencia de las utilidades, el contenido informativo de los dividendos, el efecto clientela y los costos de agencia para definir la política de dividendos de las corporaciones en México.

CORPORATE LIQUIDITY, DIVIDEND POLICY AND DEFAULT RISK: OPTIMAL FINANCIAL POLICY AND AGENCY COSTS

2010 ◽  
Vol 13 (04) ◽  
pp. 537-576 ◽  
Author(s):  
YANN BRAOUEZEC ◽  
CHARLES-ALBERT LEHALLE
Keyword(s):  
Default Risk ◽  
Agency Costs ◽  
Dividend Policy ◽  
Base Case ◽  
Financial Policy ◽  
Maturity Model ◽  
Corporate Liquidity ◽  
Optimal Dividend ◽  
Corporate Financial Policy ◽  
Optimal Dividend Policy

We study the simplest discrete-time finite-maturity model in which default arises when the firm is not able to pay its debt obligation using the current cash-flow plus the corporate liquidity. An important distinction is made between liquidity and solvency of the firm. The corporate financial policy is simultaneously defined by the dividend policy, and the leverage policy (the coupon and the principal of the bond). When the corporate financial policy implies no default risk and no taxes, we show that the corporate financial policy is irrelevant and this irrelevance result holds for any probability measure. When the corporate financial policy implies now some default risk, we show that the value of the firm is a piecewise decreasing function of the dividend policy for any leverage policy, so that dividend policy affects the value of the firm. However, shareholders may not always have the incentives to implement this optimal dividend policy. We show that when the value of the assets is low, shareholders have an incentive to deviate from this optimal dividend policy, and we also study the resulting agency costs. We finally compare the resulting quantities of our model to the base case suggested by Huang and Huang (2003).

scholarly journals Dividend Policy, Agency Costs, and Earned Equity

2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harry DeAngelo ◽  
Linda DeAngelo ◽  
Rene Stulz
Keyword(s):  
Agency Costs ◽  
Dividend Policy
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