Pitfalls of Monetary Policy Under the Incomplete Information: Imprecise Indicators and Real Indeterminacy

2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eugenio Gaiotti
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Real Indeterminacy

Monetary policy games, financial instability and incomplete information

2016 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 161-178 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles Richard Barrett ◽  
Ioanna Kokores ◽  
Somnath Sen
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Financial Instability ◽  
Policy Games

scholarly journals Monetary Policy, Incomplete Information, and the Zero Lower Bound

2017 ◽  
Vol 65 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-70 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Gust ◽  
Benjamin K. Johannsen ◽  
J. David López-Salido
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Lower Bound ◽  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Zero Lower Bound

scholarly journals Monetary Policy, Incomplete Information, and the Zero Lower Bound

2015 ◽  
Vol 2015 (099) ◽  
pp. 1-41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Gust ◽  
◽  
Benjamin K. Johannsen ◽  
David Lopez-Salido ◽  
◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Lower Bound ◽  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Zero Lower Bound

Implementation Errors and Incomplete Information

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rafael Portillo ◽  
Filiz Unsal ◽  
Stephen O’Connell ◽  
Catherine Pattillo
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Interest Rates ◽  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Low Income ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Structural Features ◽  
New Keynesian ◽  
Low Income Countries ◽  
Keynesian Model ◽  
Policy Frameworks

This chapter shows that limited effects of monetary policy can reflect shortcomings of existing policy frameworks in low-income countries rather than (or in addition to) the structural features often put forward in policy and academic debates. The chapter focuses on two pervasive issues: lack of effective frameworks for implementing policy, so that short-term interest rates display considerable unintended volatility, and poor communication about policy intent. The authors introduce these features into an otherwise standard New Keynesian model with incomplete information. Implementation errors result from insufficient accommodation to money demand shocks, creating a noisy wedge between actual and intended interest rates. The representative private agent must then infer policy intentions from movements in interest rates and money. Under these conditions, even exogenous and persistent changes in the stance of monetary policy can have weak effects, even when the underlying transmission (as might be observed under complete information) is strong.

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