The Cost of Raising Capital - New Evidence from Seasoned Equity Offerings in Switzerland

2003 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christoph Kaserer ◽  
Fabian Steiner
2015 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 303-328 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xinghua Gao ◽  
Yonghong Jia

This article examines the role of internal control requirements under the Sarbanes–Oxley (SOX) Act of 2002 in firms’ cost of raising equity capital. We find that, prior to the disclosure of internal control weaknesses (ICWs), ICWs are not directly associated with underwriters’ gross spread and seasoned equity offering (SEO) underpricing. After the disclosure, however, underwriters charge a risk premium on ICW issuers, especially on those disclosing ICWs in multiple consecutive years. We also find that SEO underpricing is exacerbated by multiple-year-disclosed ICWs but not by first-timers. More notably, we find that managers play a dominant role in deciding issue size pre-disclosure, but this dominance weakens post-disclosure. Taken together, our evidence suggests that internal controls help moderate the cost of raising equity capital and that ICW disclosures have significant implications for underwriters in the equity issue market.


Author(s):  
James Brugler ◽  
Carole Comerton-Forde ◽  
Terrence Hendershott

Abstract We provide evidence on market structure and the cost of raising capital by examining changes in market structure in U.S. equity markets. Only the Order Handling Rules (OHR) of the Nasdaq, the one reform that reduced institutional trading costs, lowered the cost of raising capital. Using a difference-in-differences framework relative to the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) that exploits the OHR’s staggered implementation, we find that the OHR reduced the underpricing of seasoned equity offerings by 1–2 percentage points compared with a pre-OHR average of 3.6%. The effect is the largest in stocks with the largest reduction in institutional trading costs after the OHR.


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