Reputation, Information Signals, and Willingness to Pay for Heterogeneous Goods in Online Auctions

2003 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mikhail I. Melnik ◽  
James Robert Alm
Author(s):  
Dolores Garrido ◽  
R. Karina Gallardo ◽  
Carolyn F. Ross ◽  
Maria Laura Montero ◽  
Juming Tang

2007 ◽  
Vol 44 (2) ◽  
pp. 324-333 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tat Y. Chan ◽  
Vrinda Kadiyali ◽  
Young-Hoon Park

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 27-66 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elena Krasnokutskaya ◽  
Christian Terwiesch ◽  
Lucia Tiererova

We invoke the insights from the auction literature to study trade in services using data from an online market for programming support. We find that the observed clustering of trade between countries can be rationalized through a model featuring endogenous sorting of sellers who are heterogeneous in both quality and costs across projects offered by buyers who differ in outside option and willingness to pay for quality. To accommodate the possibility of such an outcome we extend a single-auction entry model to a setting where sellers choose among multiple projects. This feature plays an important role in explaining the data and understanding the effects of various trade policies. (JEL D44, F14, L15, L86)


2010 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 907-924 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paulo B. Goes ◽  
Gilbert G. Karuga ◽  
Arvind K. Tripathi

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document