Cash Compensation and Earnings' Components Around CEO Turnover: Does the Compensation Committee See Over the Horizon?

2003 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark R. Huson ◽  
Christine I. Wiedman ◽  
Heather A. Wier
Keyword(s):  
Ceo Turnover ◽  
Compensation Committee ◽  
Earnings Components ◽  
Cash Compensation

Compensation Committees' Treatment of Earnings Components in CEOs' Terminal Years

2011 ◽  
Vol 87 (1) ◽  
pp. 231-259 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark R. Huson ◽  
Yao Tian ◽  
Christine I. Wiedman ◽  
Heather A. Wier
Keyword(s):  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Negative Effects ◽  
Compensation Committee ◽  
Earnings Components ◽  
Cash Compensation ◽  
Flow Through ◽  
Administrative Expenditures ◽  
New Evidence ◽  
Compensation Function ◽  
Compensation Committees

ABSTRACT Compensation committees face special difficulties when setting pay in the last years of a CEO's tenure. For example, incentives to manipulate earnings for the purpose of enhancing earnings-based compensation are greater in CEOs' terminal years. We predict that compensation committees are aware of these incentives and adjust the relative weights placed on earnings components in the cash compensation function to mitigate the problem. Consistent with our prediction, we find that in CEOs' terminal years, positive changes in discretionary accruals receive significantly less weight than other income components in determining cash compensation. This provides new evidence that not all gains flow through to compensation. We also find that in non-terminal years, managers' compensation is partially shielded from the negative effects of selling, general, and administrative expenditures (SG&A), but this effect reverses in the terminal period, consistent with the compensation committee discouraging investment in legacy assets by outgoing CEOs. Overall, our findings suggest that compensation committees treat components of earnings differently when setting pay in the terminal period. JEL Classifications: M41; J33.

scholarly journals Industry Expertise of Independent Directors and Board Monitoring

2015 ◽  
Vol 50 (5) ◽  
pp. 929-962 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cong Wang ◽  
Fei Xie ◽  
Min Zhu
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Chief Executive Officer ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Ceo Turnover ◽  
Independent Directors ◽  
Compensation Committee ◽  
Board Monitoring ◽  
Industry Experience ◽  
Industry Expertise

AbstractWe examine whether the industry expertise of independent directors affects board monitoring effectiveness. We find that the presence of independent directors with industry experience on a firm’s audit committee significantly curtails firms’ earnings management. In addition, a greater representation of independent directors with industry expertise on a firm’s compensation committee reduces chief executive officer (CEO) excess compensation, and a greater presence of such directors on the full board increases the CEO turnover-performance sensitivity and improves acquirer returns from diversifying acquisitions. Overall, the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that having relevant industry expertise enhances independent directors’ ability to perform their monitoring function.

Corporate governance, CEO turnover and say on pay votes

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ayishat Omar ◽  
Alex P. Tang ◽  
Yu Cong
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Ceo Turnover ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Compensation Committee ◽  
Say On Pay ◽  
The Usa ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Female Member

Purpose The purpose of this study is to investigate how compensation committee structure or characteristic impacts say on pay (SOP) voting dissent and the impact of SOP dissent on chief executive officer (CEO) turnover. Design/methodology/approach The authors use corporate governance and SOP data to test the relationships amongst variables. Additional analysis is performed using one-to-one propensity-score matched samples. Findings The authors find that firm-years with at least a female member present on the compensation committee are associated with lower SOP dissent. The authors find mixed results of the impact of SOP dissent on CEO turnover. Practical implications This paper suggests that diversity on the compensation committee, particularly the presence of at least a female member on the committee, serves as an important determinant of SOP voting outcome in the USA. The paper provides policymakers and practitioners with insights into factors influencing SOP voting outcomes and implications of SOP dissent for firms. Originality/value The findings of this paper contribute to the corporate governance literature by enhancing the understanding of the role of the compensation committee as it relates to SOP dissent and effect of SOP dissent on CEO turnover.

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