scholarly journals Strategic Interactions of Bilateral Monopoly on a Private Highway

2003 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erik T. Verhoef ◽  
Judith Y.T. Wang ◽  
Hai Yang
Keyword(s):  
Strategic Interactions ◽  
Bilateral Monopoly ◽  
Private Highway

scholarly journals Strategic Interactions of Bilateral Monopoly on a Private Highway

2004 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 203-235 ◽  
Author(s):  
Judith Y.T. Wang ◽  
Hai Yang ◽  
Erik T. Verhoef
Keyword(s):  
Strategic Interactions ◽  
Bilateral Monopoly ◽  
Private Highway

A Further Note on the Problem of Bilateral Monopoly

1940 ◽  
Vol 48 (2) ◽  
pp. 238-243 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. M. Henderson
Keyword(s):  
Bilateral Monopoly

scholarly journals The anti-mercenary norm and the market for combat force

2021 ◽  
pp. 002070202199451
Author(s):  
Ulrich Petersohn
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Strategic Interaction ◽  
Strategic Interactions ◽  
Norm Violation ◽  
Reputational Costs

Since 2013, combat services have been increasingly exchanged on the market. This development is puzzling since the practice emerged despite an anti-mercenary norm banning such services, and without any revision of the norm. The article argues that the combat market is not a deliberate design, but the result of strategic interaction. For some, compliance with the anti-mercenary norm is the best strategy, while for others, violating the norm is best. However, once the norm violation occurs, it is in the interest of all actors to maintain a façade of compliance. Non-compliant actors benefit from the combat services, and compliant actors do not have to engage in costly sanctioning of the norm violation, and avoid the reputational costs associated with non-enforcement. The article employs game theory to investigate the strategic interactions of actors across 11 combat contracts from 2013 to 2019.

Ambiguous Encounters: Revisiting Foucault and Goffman at an Activation Programme for Asylum-seekers

2020 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 177-206 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katrine Syppli Kohl
Keyword(s):  
Qualitative Study ◽  
Asylum Seekers ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Strategic Interactions ◽  
Cyclical Process ◽  
Health And Well Being ◽  
Roll Out

Abstract This qualitative study combined the approaches of Foucault and Goffman to investigate the consequences of a “roll-out” neoliberal “activation” programme on Denmark’s reception of asylum-seekers. The analysis found that the activation programme is an ambiguous technology of power intended to shape asylum-seekers into productive citizens by simultaneously disciplining them and improving their health and well-being, while using their labour to reduce costs. The strategic interactions in the job centre reflected the ambiguities created by these oft-incongruent aims, and activation caused conflicts as it amplified activities experienced as meaningless and humiliating. I argue that these consequences stem from the ambiguity, uncertainty, and trouble produced at the intersection of competing projects of rule in a “sensitive space”, and that the individualisation of responsibility for their own marginalisation, simultaneously serve to exclude asylum-seekers and to confine them to categories that license continued institutional discipline. Thereby, the intervention feeds cyclical process of failed integration and ill-fated interventions. Indeed, by individualising the responsibility for integration, such interventions depoliticise the marginalisation of citizens of immigrant decent and legitimise efforts to reduce immigration by fuelling problematisations of immigrants as expensive, deviant, and less employable.

The Stackelberg Games of Water Extraction with Myopic Agents

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alain Jean-Marie ◽  
Mabel Tidball ◽  
Víctor Bucarey López
Keyword(s):  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Infinite Horizon ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Water Extraction ◽  
Discount Factor ◽  
Stackelberg Games ◽  
Groundwater Extraction ◽  
Strategic Interactions ◽  
Water Users ◽  
Threshold Policies

We consider a discrete-time, infinite-horizon dynamic game of groundwater extraction. A Water Agency charges an extraction cost to water users and controls the marginal extraction cost so that it depends not only on the level of groundwater but also on total water extraction (through a parameter [Formula: see text] that represents the degree of strategic interactions between water users) and on rainfall (through parameter [Formula: see text]). The water users are selfish and myopic, and the goal of the agency is to give them incentives so as to improve their total discounted welfare. We look at this problem in several situations. In the first situation, the parameters [Formula: see text] and [Formula: see text] are considered to be fixed over time. The first result shows that when the Water Agency is patient (the discount factor tends to 1), the optimal marginal extraction cost asks for strategic interactions between agents. The contrary holds for a discount factor near 0. In a second situation, we look at the dynamic Stackelberg game where the Agency decides at each time what cost parameter they must announce. We study theoretically and numerically the solution to this problem. Simulations illustrate the possibility that threshold policies are good candidates for optimal policies.

Financial Reporting, Auditing, Analyst Scrutiny, and Investment Efficiency

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Derek Chan ◽  
Nanqin Liu
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Financial Statement ◽  
Investment Efficiency ◽  
Strategic Interactions ◽  
Financial Reports ◽  
Audit Failure ◽  
Economic Framework ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Ex Ante

This paper presents an economic framework to study strategic interactions along the analyst-auditor-owner disciplinary chain, in which the auditor examines the financial reports prepared by the owner, and the analyst uncovers financial misreporting as well as audit failure. We find that although analyst scrutiny ex post detects misreporting, it ex ante aggravates the owner's misreporting behavior and further impairs financial statement reliability if the legal penalties for the auditor and the owner are small. We also show how the effects of a regulation depend on its target's disciplinarian(s). Specifically, (i) although enhancing the auditor's legal liability always increases audit quality and financial statement reliability, it decreases investment efficiency if and only if the analyst is highly independent; and (ii) increasing the owner's misreporting penalty decreases investment efficiency if and only if either of (but not both) the regulations on the auditor and the analyst is strict.

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