The Welfare Effects of Third Degree Price Discrimination in Intermediate Good Markets: The Case of Bargaining

Author(s):  
Daniel P. O'Brien
1991 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 571 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Armstrong ◽  
John Vickers

2019 ◽  
Vol 55 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-45
Author(s):  
Francisco Galera ◽  
Pedro Garcia-del-Barrio ◽  
Pedro Mendi

2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 1213-1238 ◽  
Author(s):  
Iñaki Aguirre

Abstract This paper studies the welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination when competitive pressure varies across markets. In particular, we study the economic aspects of the Robinson–Patman Act associated with the “meeting competition defense.” Using equilibrium models, the main result we find is that this defense might be used successfully in cases of primary line injury precisely when it should not be used, namely when price discrimination reduces social welfare. This result obtains both when discrimination appears in the final good market and when it is used in the intermediate goods market. We also find that these results may maintain under secondary line injury.


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