The political effects of female representation: Evidence from a regression-discontinuity design

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
António Valentim
Keyword(s):  
Regression Discontinuity ◽  
The Political ◽  
Regression Discontinuity Design ◽  
Female Representation ◽  
Political Effects

scholarly journals Winners and Losers of the Ballot: Electronic vs. Traditional Paper Voting Systems in Brazil

2018 ◽  
Vol 60 (2) ◽  
pp. 41-60 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rodrigo Schneider ◽  
Kelly N. Senters
Keyword(s):  
Survey Data ◽  
Regression Discontinuity ◽  
Electronic Voting ◽  
The Political ◽  
Regression Discontinuity Design ◽  
Voting Systems ◽  
Political Effects ◽  
Ballot Design ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Gradual Transformation

AbstractScholars concur that free and fair elections are essential for proper democratic functioning, but our understanding of the political effects of democratic voting systems is incomplete. This article mitigates the gap by exploiting the gradual transformation of voting systems and ballot structures in Brazil’s 1998 executive elections to study the relationship between voting systems and viable and nonviable candidates’ vote shares, using regression discontinuity design. It finds that the introduction of electronic voting concentrated vote shares among viable candidates and thus exhibited electoral bias. We posit that this result occurred because viable candidates were better able to communicate the information that electronic voters needed to cast valid ballots than were their nonviable counterparts. The article uses survey data to demonstrate that electronic voters responded to changes in ballot design and internalized the information viable candidates made available to them.

scholarly journals The Political Economy of Program Enforcement: Evidence from Brazil

2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 750-791 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fernanda Brollo ◽  
Katja Kaufmann ◽  
Eliana La Ferrara
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Regression Discontinuity ◽  
School Attendance ◽  
The Political ◽  
Regression Discontinuity Design ◽  
Welfare Programs ◽  
Municipal Elections ◽  
Electoral Outcomes ◽  
Poor Families ◽  
Bolsa Familia

Abstract Do politicians manipulate the enforcement of conditional welfare programs to influence electoral outcomes? We study the Bolsa Familia Program (BFP) in Brazil, which provides a monthly stipend to poor families conditional on school attendance. Repeated failure to comply with this requirement results in increasing penalties. First, we exploit random variation in the timing when beneficiaries learn about penalties for noncompliance around the 2008 municipal elections. We find that the vote share of candidates aligned with the president is lower in zip codes where more beneficiaries received penalties shortly before (as opposed to shortly after) the elections. Second, we show that politicians strategically manipulate enforcement. Using a regression discontinuity design, we find weaker enforcement before elections in municipalities where mayors from the presidential coalition can run for reelection. We provide evidence that manipulation occurs through misreporting school attendance, particularly in municipalities with a higher fraction of students in schools with politically connected principals.

The Politics of Succession in Charismatic Movements: Routinization versus Revival in Argentina, Venezuela, and Peru

2020 ◽  
Vol 52 (2) ◽  
pp. 289-315
Author(s):  
Caitlin Andrews-Lee
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Regression Discontinuity ◽  
The Political ◽  
Regression Discontinuity Design ◽  
Political Systems ◽  
National Elections ◽  
Leadership Selection ◽  
Party Leaders ◽  
The World ◽  
And Control

Scholars suggest that charismatic movements must institutionalize to survive beyond the death of the founder. Yet charismatic movements around the world that have maintained their personalistic nature have persisted or reemerged. This article investigates the conditions under which politicians can use their predecessors' charismatic legacies to revive these movements and consolidate power. I argue that three conditions - the mode of leadership selection, the presence of a crisis, and the ability to conform to the founder's personalistic nature - shape successors' capacity to pick up their forefather's mantle and restore the movement to political predominance. To demonstrate my theory, I trace the process through which some leaders succeeded while others failed to embody the founder's legacy across three charismatic movements: Argentine Peronism, Venezuelan Chavismo, and Peruvian Fujimorismo. Alexander Lee, Incumbency, Parties, and Legislatures: Theory and Evidence from India Incumbent legislators in some developing countries are often thought to face an electoral disadvantage relative to challengers. This article traces this effect to high levels of centralization within the political parties and governments of these countries. In political systems dominated by party leaders, legislators face substantial formal and informal constraints on their ability to influence policy, stake positions, and control patronage, which in turn reduce their ability to build up personal votes. This theory is tested on a dataset of Indian national elections since 1977, using a regression discontinuity design to measure the effects of incumbency. Candidates less affected by centralization - those from less-centralized political parties and from parties not affected by restrictions on free parliamentary voting - have a low or non-existent incumbency disadvantage.

scholarly journals Moderating Political Extremism: Single Round versus Runoff Elections under Plurality Rule

2016 ◽  
Vol 106 (8) ◽  
pp. 2349-2370 ◽  
Author(s):  
Massimo Bordignon ◽  
Tommaso Nannicini ◽  
Guido Tabellini
Keyword(s):  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Regression Discontinuity ◽  
Plurality Rule ◽  
The Political ◽  
Regression Discontinuity Design ◽  
Political Extremism ◽  
Political Candidates ◽  
Party Formation ◽  
Runoff Elections

We compare single round versus runoff elections under plurality rule, allowing for partly endogenous party formation. Under runoff elections, the number of political candidates is larger, but the influence of extremist voters on equilibrium policy, and hence policy volatility, is smaller because the bargaining power of the political extremes is reduced compared to single round elections. The predictions on the number of candidates and on policy volatility are confirmed by evidence from a regression discontinuity design in Italy, where cities above 15,000 inhabitants elect the mayor with a runoff system, while those below hold single round elections. (JEL C78, D72)

scholarly journals The Political Resource Curse

2013 ◽  
Vol 103 (5) ◽  
pp. 1759-1796 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fernanda Brollo ◽  
Tommaso Nannicini ◽  
Roberto Perotti ◽  
Guido Tabellini
Keyword(s):  
Regression Discontinuity ◽  
Resource Curse ◽  
Political Corruption ◽  
The Political ◽  
Regression Discontinuity Design ◽  
Municipal Governments ◽  
Agency Model ◽  
Political Resource ◽  
Average Education

This paper studies the effect of additional government revenues on political corruption and on the quality of politicians, both with theory and data. The theory is based on a political agency model with career concerns and endogenous entry of candidates. The data refer to Brazil, where federal transfers to municipal governments change exogenously at given population thresholds, allowing us to implement a regression discontinuity design. The empirical evidence shows that larger transfers increase observed corruption and reduce the average education of candidates for mayor. These and other more specific empirical results are in line with the predictions of the theory. (JEL D72, D73, H77, O17, O18)

Incumbency, Parties, and Legislatures: Theory and Evidence from India

2020 ◽  
Vol 52 (2) ◽  
pp. 311-331
Author(s):  
Alexander Lee
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
Political Parties ◽  
Regression Discontinuity ◽  
The Political ◽  
Regression Discontinuity Design ◽  
Political Systems ◽  
National Elections ◽  
Party Leaders ◽  
And Control ◽  
Incumbency Disadvantage

Incumbent legislators in some developing countries are often thought to face an electoral disadvantage relative to challengers. This article traces this effect to high levels of centralization within the political parties and governments of these countries. In political systems dominated by party leaders, legislators face substantial formal and informal constraints on their ability to influence policy, stake positions, and control patronage, which in turn reduce their ability to build up personal votes. This theory is tested on a dataset of Indian national elections since 1977, using a regression discontinuity design to measure the effects of incumbency. Candidates less affected by centralization-those from less-centralized political parties and from parties not affected by restrictions on free parliamentary voting - have a low or non-existent incumbency disadvantage.

scholarly journals Tying Your Enemy's Hands in Close Races: The Politics of Federal Transfers in Brazil

2012 ◽  
Vol 106 (4) ◽  
pp. 742-761 ◽  
Author(s):  
FERNANDA BROLLO ◽  
TOMMASO NANNICINI
Keyword(s):  
Federal Government ◽  
Political Party ◽  
Regression Discontinuity ◽  
Federal State ◽  
The Political ◽  
Regression Discontinuity Design ◽  
Intergovernmental Transfers ◽  
Municipal Governments ◽  
Political Alignment

This article uses a regression discontinuity design in close electoral races to disclose purely political reasons in the allocation of intergovernmental transfers in a federal state. We identify the effect of political alignment on federal transfers to municipal governments in Brazil, and find that—in preelection years—municipalities in which the mayor is affiliated with the coalition (and especially with the political party) of the Brazilian president receive approximately one-third larger discretionary transfers for infrastructures. This effect is primarily driven by the fact that the federal government penalizes municipalities run by mayors from the opposition coalition who won by a narrow margin, thereby tying their hands for the next election.

Kämpfe um Bergbau und die Möglichkeiten demokratischer Transformation

2017 ◽  
Vol 47 (189) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kristina Dietz
Keyword(s):  
Direct Democracy ◽  
Social Power ◽  
Political Agenda ◽  
The Political ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Political Effects ◽  
Mining Project ◽  
National Governments ◽  
The Relationship

The article explores the political effects of popular consultations as a means of direct democracy in struggles over mining. Building on concepts from participatory and materialist democracy theory, it shows the transformative potentials of processes of direct democracy towards democratization and emancipation under, and beyond, capitalist and liberal democratic conditions. Empirically the analysis is based on a case study on the protests against the La Colosa gold mining project in Colombia. The analysis reveals that although processes of direct democracy in conflicts over mining cannot transform existing class inequalities and social power relations fundamentally, they can nevertheless alter elements thereof. These are for example the relationship between local and national governments, changes of the political agenda of mining and the opening of new spaces for political participation, where previously there were none. It is here where it’s emancipatory potential can be found.

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