Embedding the recovery and resilience facility into the European Semester: Macroeconomic coordination gains and democratic limits

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jerome Creel ◽  
Nicolas Leron ◽  
Francesco Saraceno ◽  
Xavier Ragot
Keyword(s):  
Macroeconomic Coordination

The Problem in Detail

2019 ◽  
pp. 35-93
Author(s):  
Thomas Kalinowski
Keyword(s):  
Financial Regulation ◽  
Global Financial Crisis ◽  
Historical Overview ◽  
International Conflicts ◽  
International Regulation ◽  
Macroeconomic Coordination ◽  
Currency Competition ◽  
The Global Financial Crisis ◽  
Political Economic

This chapter sets the stage for the empirical investigation of the domestic political economic sources of international conflicts and cooperation. It consists of four parts. First, it gives a general brief historical overview over the problems of the international regulation of finance since nineteenth-century imperialism until the global financial crisis that started in 2008. Second, it introduces the G20 as the main forum for global economic cooperation. Third, it offers an overview of the different reactions to the global economic crisis since 2008. Fourth, it introduces the major conflicts in the G20 about the international regulation of finance in the three crucial areas identified in Chapter 1: global imbalances and macroeconomic coordination, financial globalization and financial regulation, as well as currency competition and management.

Exclusive Club Under Stress

2019 ◽  
pp. 124-164 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dirk Peters
Keyword(s):  
Civil Society ◽  
Small Groups ◽  
Civil Society Organizations ◽  
Rising Powers ◽  
Post Cold War ◽  
Fundamental Level ◽  
Policy Content ◽  
Macroeconomic Coordination ◽  
Rising Power

This chapter traces how the seemingly united front against the G7 by rising powers and civil society actors broke apart in the early 2010s. While rising power criticism of the G7 waned after the first G20 summits, civil society organizations (CSOs) maintained their critical stance and extended it to the G20. The chapter argues that, from the beginning, contestation by the two sets of actors had focused on different issues. Opposition by rising powers was driven mainly by their own exclusion from the governance club. In contrast, many civil society actors rejected not only the exclusiveness of the G7 on a much more fundamental level but also the idea of liberal macroeconomic coordination as such (policy content). To demonstrate this, the chapter develops a framework for analysis, based on the introductory chapter to this volume. It, then, describes the G7 and its post-Cold War development and analyses the key institutional bones of contention for the BRICS states and for important non-state actors. The analysis shows that rising power governments always had been much closer to business actors and G7 members than to CSOs in their vision for macroeconomic governance. The upgrading of the G20 brought the divergence of positions between the BRICS and CSOs clearly to light as it satisfied the BRICS’ desire for inclusion and left CSOs alone with their more fundamental critique of liberal governance through small groups of powerful states.

Unions, Employers, and Central Banks: Macroeconomic Coordination and Institutional Change in Social Market Economies. Edited by Torben Iversen, Jonas Pontusson, and David Soskice. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000. 339p. $64.95 cloth, $22.95 paper.

2001 ◽  
Vol 95 (2) ◽  
pp. 499-501 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chris Howell
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
New Approach ◽  
Cambridge University ◽  
Continuity And Change ◽  
Power Resources ◽  
The Social ◽  
Political Economies ◽  
Macroeconomic Coordination ◽  
Social Market

Comparative political economy has been transformed since the end of the 1970s. The explanatory value of class conflict, the power resources of social classes, and the social base of particular national models of political economy have been replaced by an emphasis upon the role of institutions in explaining both how contemporary political economies func- tion and their capacity to manage international economic integration. The fruits of this institutional turn have now emerged into a fully fledged new approach, as evidenced by the volume under review, by Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism (edited by Herbert Kitschelt, Peter Lange, Gary Marks, and John D. Stephens, 1999), and by a forthcoming volume, Varieties of Capitalism, edited by Peter Hall and David Soskice. These three books overlap to a great degree in both theoretical approach and list of contributors.

Macroeconomic coordination failure under oligempory

2002 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 93-112 ◽  
Author(s):  
Esma Gaygısız ◽  
Paul Madden
Keyword(s):  
Coordination Failure ◽  
Macroeconomic Coordination

scholarly journals A macroeconomist’s view on EU governance reform: Why and how to establish policy coordination?

2011 ◽  
Vol 56 (191) ◽  
pp. 69-88 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hubert Gabrisch
Keyword(s):  
Real Exchange Rates ◽  
Policy Coordination ◽  
Governance Reform ◽  
Current Account Imbalances ◽  
Clear Identification ◽  
Employment Goals ◽  
Macroeconomic Coordination ◽  
Level Institution ◽  
High Level ◽  
The Eu

This paper discusses the need for macroeconomic policy coordination in the E(M)U. Coordination of national policies with cross-border effects does not exist at the macroeconomic level, although requested by the EU Treaty. The need for coordination stems from current account imbalances, which origin in market-induced capital flows, destabilizing the real exchange rates between low and high wage countries. The recent attempts of the Commission and the European Council to reform E(M)U governance do not address this problem and thus remain incapable to protect against future instability. Macroeconomic coordination needs (I) a clear identification of union-wide employment goals, and (II) the establishment of a high level institution responsible for coordination following these objectives. The paper proposes a High Representative for Economic Policy, equipped with an appropriate office and supported by a Council of Economic Advisers committed to the union-wide objectives.

scholarly journals Macroeconomic Coordination in the Eurasian Economic Union: Strategic Aspects

2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 38-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sergey Shokhin ◽  
Ekaterina Kudryashova
Keyword(s):  
Strategic Planning ◽  
Economic Integration ◽  
Best Practice ◽  
Free Movement ◽  
Eurasian Economic Union ◽  
Coordination Process ◽  
Free Movement Of Goods ◽  
Economic Union ◽  
Macroeconomic Coordination ◽  
Free Movement Of Capital

Coordinated macroeconomic policy is a special element within the integration process in addition to the four freedoms usual for economic integration: free movement of goods, free movement of services, free movement of labor, and free movement of capital. Macroeconomic coordination was, from the very beginning, a key idea behind each stage of the process of Eurasian economic integration. The politico-ideological foundation of the Eurasian idea is the facilitation of growth for Eurasian countries on the basis of economic pragmatism. The macroeconomic coordination process within the Eurasian Economic Union is based on the coordination of strategic planning systems in each Member State. Strategic planning plays an important role in macroeconomic coordination. Strategic planning documents have a sound legal basis in the Treaty establishing the Eurasian Economic Union. At the same time Eurasian integration provides a platform for best practice exchanges and coordination of strategic planning between the Member States.

Monetary Power Reconsidered: The Struggle between the Bundesbank and the Fed over Monetary Leadership

2019 ◽  
Vol 63 (4) ◽  
pp. 938-951 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arie Krampf
Keyword(s):  
Inflation Targeting ◽  
World Order ◽  
Institutional Power ◽  
Sequence Of Events ◽  
The Us ◽  
Macroeconomic Coordination ◽  
Monetary Order ◽  
Reserve System ◽  
Cross National

Abstract This article reexamines the theory of monetary power to explain the role of the Bundesbank (and Germany) in the emergence of the rules-based low-inflation regime in the late1980s and early 1990s. Our theory of monetary power draws on the notion of institutional power and the concept of monetary leadership, understood as the capacity to attract foreign investment, and thereby explains how domestic institutional features and contingent historical events affect countries’ external monetary power. This theory is employed to trace how the Bundesbank go-it-alone strategy in 1989 triggered a cross-national sequence of events that changed the international monetary order in a way that was consistent with the German interests. The transition was marked by a shift from the US-led pragmatist approach of international macroeconomic coordination to a rules-based approach founded on the principle of low-inflation–targeting. The article argues that this change took place despite the opposition of the Federal Reserve System (Fed) and the US Treasury. The article contributes to the literature on the decline of US hegemonic power as well as the literature on the mechanism of institutional change at the international level. It also sheds new light on current debates about the putative decline of the rules-based world order.

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