Problem of Legitimacy of a Government in a 2-Party Plurality Rule

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Taposik Banerjee
Keyword(s):  
Plurality Rule

Was Duverger Correct? Single-Member District Election Outcomes in Fifty-three Countries

2012 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 201-220 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew M. Singer
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Arrangements ◽  
District Level ◽  
Party Competition ◽  
Plurality Rule ◽  
Third Place ◽  
Institutional Rules ◽  
Large Numbers ◽  
Level Data ◽  
Number Of Parties ◽  
Duverger's Law

In districts where only one seat is contested, the electoral formula (plurality or majority) should be a major determinant of the number of parties that receive votes. Specifically, plurality rule should generate two-party competition while other institutional arrangements should generate electoral fragmentation. Yet tests of these propositions using district-level data have focused on a limited number of cases; they rarely contrast different electoral systems and have reached mixed conclusions. This study analyses district-level data from 6,745 single-member district election contests from 53 democratic countries to test the evidence for Duverger's Law and Hypothesis. Double-ballot majoritarian systems have large numbers of candidates, as predicted, but while the average outcome under plurality rule is generally consistent with two-party competition, it is not perfectly so. The two largest parties typically dominate the districts (generally receiving more than 90 per cent of the vote), and there is very little support for parties finishing fourth or worse. Yet third-place parties do not completely disappear, and ethnic divisions shape party fragmentation levels, even under plurality rule. Finally, institutional rules that generate multiparty systems elsewhere in the country increase electoral fragmentation in single-member plurality districts.

Consensus sequences based on plurality rule

1992 ◽  
Vol 54 (6) ◽  
pp. 1057-1068 ◽  
Author(s):  
W DAY ◽  
F MCMORRIS
Keyword(s):  
Plurality Rule ◽  
Consensus Sequences

scholarly journals Weighted voting on the IMF Managing Director

2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 237-244
Author(s):  
Alexander Mayer ◽  
Stefan Napel
Keyword(s):  
International Monetary Fund ◽  
Executive Director ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Plurality Rule ◽  
Executive Directors ◽  
Voting Rules ◽  
Weighted Voting ◽  
To Come ◽  
A Priori Distribution ◽  
The International Monetary Fund

Abstract Executive Directors of the International Monetary Fund elect the Fund’s Managing Director from a shortlist of three candidates; financial quotas of IMF members define the respective numbers of votes. The implied a priori distribution of success (preference satisfaction) is compared across different electoral procedures. The USA’s Executive Director can expect to come closer to its top preference under plurality rule than for pairwise majority comparisons or plurality with a runoff; opposite applies to everybody else. Differences of US success between voting rules dominate the within-rule differences between most other Directors, and much of the latest reform of quotas.

Convergence of Iterative Voting Under Restrictive Dynamics for Plurality Rule: A Review

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Saira Sultan ◽  
Al Syeda Maham Huda ◽  
Afsana Durrani ◽  
Hadia Bibi ◽  
Neelam Gohar
Keyword(s):  
Plurality Rule ◽  
Iterative Voting

Path-dependency and coordination in multi-candidate elections with behavioral voters

2017 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 520-545 ◽  
Author(s):  
Costel Andonie ◽  
Daniel Diermeier
Keyword(s):  
Stationary Distribution ◽  
Voting Behavior ◽  
Behavioral Model ◽  
Path Dependency ◽  
Plurality Rule ◽  
Aspiration Level ◽  
Initial State ◽  
Positive Impression ◽  
Path Dependent ◽  
Negative Impression

We consider a behavioral model of voting in multi-candidate elections under plurality rule. In the case of a positive impression of the campaign leader, voters increase their propensity to vote for that candidate, while in the case of a negative impression voters decrease their propensity. The formation of positive or negative impressions depends on an endogenous aspiration level. We show that in multi-candidate elections, in any stationary distribution, the winner receives a share of 50% of votes. Our results suggest that achieving coordination is ‘path-dependent’: whether voters manage to coordinate on the majority-preferred candidate critically depends on the initial state. We then identify conditions that make the election of the majority-preferred candidate more likely. However, even if the majority candidate is elected for sure, voting behavior is only partially coordinated.

scholarly journals Approval Voting

1995 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-49 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert J Weber
Keyword(s):  
Median Voter ◽  
Plurality Rule ◽  
Approval Voting ◽  
History Of ◽  
Candidate Positioning

Under approval voting, a voter may cast single votes for each of any number of candidates. In this paper, the history of approval voting and some of its properties are reviewed. When voters vote sincerely, approval voting compares favorably with both the plurality rule and Borda's rule in yielding outcomes reflective of the electorate's will. When voters vote strategically, perverse outcomes possible under other rules cannot arise at equilibrium under approval voting. Well-known ‘median voter’ results in two-candidate positioning games generalize to multicandidate settings under approval voting but not under the plurality rule.

Do the Arrangements of Political Regimes Shape Policy Choices and Policy Outcomes?

2005 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-85
Author(s):  
Luca Murrau
Keyword(s):  
Economic Development ◽  
Comparative Politics ◽  
Political Process ◽  
Plurality Rule ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
Political Regimes ◽  
Policy Choices ◽  
Process Formation ◽  
Second Category

Abstract This work presents an overview of the literature on political process formation and the role of institutions in economic development. The first category refers to works describing models of citizen candidacy and candidate choice in which different scenarios of equilibrium under plurality rule elections are examinated. The second category includes the main empirical works studying the chain existing between political institutional features and different paths of economic development. Finally, I describe a model of comparative politics. Specifically, I compare two different political regimes, congressional-presidential regime and parliamentary regime, giving insights on policy choices and economic outcomes.

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