Do Ranked Ballots Stimulate Candidate Entry?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jack Santucci ◽  
Jamil Scott
Keyword(s):  
Candidate Entry

scholarly journals Clathrin-mediated endocytosis is a candidate entry sorting mechanism for Bombyx mori cypovirus

2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Fei Chen ◽  
Liyuan Zhu ◽  
Yiling Zhang ◽  
Dhiraj Kumar ◽  
Guangli Cao ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Bombyx Mori ◽  
Candidate Entry

Strategic Candidate Entry

2018 ◽  
pp. 147-157
Author(s):  
Kristin Kanthak ◽  
Eric Loepp
Keyword(s):  
Candidate Entry

Race, Resources, and Representation

2017 ◽  
Vol 69 (2) ◽  
pp. 327-365 ◽  
Author(s):  
Natália S. Bueno ◽  
Thad Dunning
Keyword(s):  
Campaign Contributions ◽  
Descriptive Representation ◽  
Political Class ◽  
Party Leaders ◽  
Ethnic Inequalities ◽  
Racial Gap ◽  
Racial Preferences ◽  
Economic Elites ◽  
Personal Assets ◽  
Candidate Entry

What explains the persistence of racial or ethnic inequalities in descriptive representation in the absence of strongly politicized racial or ethnic cleavages? This article uses new data to demonstrate a substantial racial gap between voters and politicians in Brazil. The authors show that this disparity is not plausibly due to racial preferences in the electorate as a whole, for instance, deference toward white candidates or discrimination against nonwhites, and that barriers to candidate entry or discrimination by party leaders do not likely explain the gap. Instead, they document persistent resource disparities between white and nonwhite candidates, including large differences in personal assets and campaign contributions. The findings suggest that elite closure—investments by racial and economic elites on behalf of elite candidates—help perpetuate a white political class, even in the absence of racialized politics. By underscoring this avenue through which representational disparities persist, the article contributes to research on elite power in democratic settings.

Do Institutions and Rules Influence Electoral Accessibility and Competitiveness? Considering the 2014 Toronto Ward Elections

2017 ◽  
Vol 55 (1) ◽  
pp. 210-230 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zack Taylor ◽  
Sandra McEleney
Keyword(s):  
Campaign Finance ◽  
Regulatory Change ◽  
Electoral Institutions ◽  
Electoral Process ◽  
Incumbency Advantage ◽  
Municipal Elections ◽  
Candidate Characteristics ◽  
The City ◽  
Electoral Competitiveness ◽  
Candidate Entry

Electoral and campaign finance reforms are believed to improve the competitiveness of elections and the accessibility of the electoral process; however, the interaction between electoral institutions and competitiveness and accessibility in nonpartisan municipal elections remains understudied. This article examines the City of Toronto, which exemplifies many of the reforms proposed in the American context, including a strict campaign finance regime and low barriers to candidate entry. Analysis of campaign finance disclosure data and candidate characteristics for Toronto’s 2014 ward elections reveals that electoral and campaign finance rules increase electoral accessibility while doing little to limit incumbency advantage. We argue that crowded nonpartisan races are low-information environments in which candidates, donors, and voters cannot assess challenger quality, which reinforces incumbent name recognition and access to campaign resources. The Toronto case highlights the limits of institutional and regulatory change as a means of increasing local electoral competitiveness and accessibility.

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