Spillover Effects from Voluntary Employer Minimum Wages

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ellora Derenoncourt ◽  
Clemens Noelke ◽  
David Weil ◽  
Bledi Taska
Keyword(s):  
Spillover Effects ◽  
Minimum Wages

Spillover Effects from Voluntary Employer Minimum Wages

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ellora Derenoncourt ◽  
Clemens Noelke ◽  
David Weil
Keyword(s):  
Spillover Effects ◽  
Minimum Wages

Spillover Effects from Voluntary Employer Minimum Wages

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ellora Derenoncourt ◽  
Clemens Noelke ◽  
David Weil ◽  
Bledi Taska
Keyword(s):  
Spillover Effects ◽  
Minimum Wages

Minimum Wages and Consumer Credit: Effects on Access and Borrowing

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lisa J Dettling ◽  
Joanne W Hsu
Keyword(s):  
Direct Effect ◽  
Credit Markets ◽  
Consumer Credit ◽  
Cost Savings ◽  
Spillover Effects ◽  
Minimum Wages ◽  
Disposable Income ◽  
Positive Spillover ◽  
Credit Scores ◽  
The Cost

Abstract This paper examines how minimum wages affect lender and borrower interactions with consumer credit markets. We find that higher state minimum wages increase the supply of unsecured credit, reduce payday loan usage, decrease delinquency, and increase credit scores. Overall, minimum wages reduce borrowing costs and have positive spillover effects on disposable income and liquidity. A back-of-the-envelope of the cost savings indicates that higher minimum wages increase disposable income by 1.3% more than implied by estimates of the direct effect on earnings.

Wage Bargaining and Minimum Wages in a Search–Matching Model

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcus Dittrich
Keyword(s):  
Minimum Wage ◽  
Spillover Effects ◽  
Theoretical Explanation ◽  
Wage Bargaining ◽  
Minimum Wages ◽  
Wage Distribution ◽  
Nash Solution ◽  
Bargaining Solution ◽  
Matching Model ◽  
The Nash Solution

In this paper, we analyze the introduction of a nonbinding minimum wage in a search–matching model with wage bargaining. Applying the Kalai–Smorodinsky bargaining solution instead of the commonly applied Nash solution, we provide a theoretical explanation for spillover effects of minimum wages on other wages higher up in the wage distribution. The labor market equilibrium in the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution with a minimum wage is characterized by lower market tightness, a higher unemployment rate, and lower vacancy rate than the equilibrium in the Nash solution. Moreover, we show that a nonbinding minimum wage can increase social welfare.

Spillover Effects of Minimum Wages in Experimental Wage Negotiations

2014 ◽  
Vol 60 (4) ◽  
pp. 780-804 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Dittrich ◽  
A. Knabe ◽  
K. Leipold
Keyword(s):  
Spillover Effects ◽  
Minimum Wages
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