What Creates Abnormal Profits: Collusion, Efficiency or Strategy?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth M. Webster ◽  
William Griffiths ◽  
Paul H. Jensen
Keyword(s):  
Abnormal Profits

Abnormal profits and relative strength in mutual fund returns

1996 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 101-116 ◽  
Author(s):  
David A. Volkman ◽  
Mark E. Wohar
Keyword(s):  
Mutual Fund ◽  
Relative Strength ◽  
Abnormal Profits

Institutional Investors and the Information Production Theory of Stock Splits

2015 ◽  
Vol 50 (3) ◽  
pp. 413-445 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas J. Chemmanur ◽  
Gang Hu ◽  
Jiekun Huang
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Stock Splits ◽  
Production Theory ◽  
Information Production ◽  
Extended Version ◽  
Institutional Trading ◽  
Before And After ◽  
Brokerage Commissions ◽  
Abnormal Profits

AbstractWe make use of a large sample of transaction-level institutional trading data to test an extended version of Brennan and Hughes’ (1991) information production theory of stock splits. We compare brokerage commissions paid by institutional investors before and after a split, assess the private information held by them, and relate the informativeness of their trading to brokerage commissions paid. We show that institutions make abnormal profits net of brokerage commissions by trading in splitting stocks. We also show that the information asymmetry faced by firms goes down after stock splits. Overall, our empirical results support the information production theory.

The Deterrent Effect of Insider Trading Enforcement Actions

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Henry Davidson ◽  
Christo Pirinsky
Keyword(s):  
Insider Trading ◽  
Deterrent Effect ◽  
Lower Probability ◽  
Enforcement Action ◽  
Abnormal Profits

We analyze whether exposure to an SEC insider trading enforcement action affects how insiders trade. We find that following an insider trading enforcement action at one firm, exposed insiders earn significantly lower abnormal profits from their trades at other firms compared to non-exposed insiders. The deterrent effect is stronger when a fellow insider is convicted and is similarly significant both pre- and post-SOX. Following the enforcement event, exposed insiders do not trade less frequently, but do trade significantly fewer shares per trade. Insiders who have witnessed an enforcement action have a lower probability for future conviction than their unexposed peers.

scholarly journals The Inter-Firm Value Effect in the Qatar Stock Market: 2005-2014

2015 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 189
Author(s):  
Omar Gharaibeh
Keyword(s):  
Stock Market ◽  
Firm Value ◽  
Factor Model ◽  
Two Measures ◽  
Value Effect ◽  
Abnormal Profits ◽  
Market Strategies ◽  
Three Factor

<p>This paper examines whether there is evidence of an inter-firm value in the returns of Qatar firms. The long-term return contrarian and book-to-market strategies are approaches commonly used to test for value effect. This study documents statistically significant abnormal profits of an inter-firm value effect with two measures. The long-term return contrarian and BE/ME strategies provide significant abnormal raw returns of 1.17% and 1.64% per month, respectively. Although each of the value strategies earns significant unadjusted profits, these profits can be explained by the Fama-French three-factor model.</p>

THE FUNDAMENTAL THEOREMS OF ASSET PRICING AND THE CLOSED-END FUND PUZZLE

2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (05) ◽  
pp. 1950025
Author(s):  
GABRIEL FRAHM ◽  
ALEXANDER JONEN ◽  
RAINER SCHÜSSLER
Keyword(s):  
Financial Markets ◽  
Initial Public Offering ◽  
Dominant Strategy ◽  
Fund Manager ◽  
Cross Sectional ◽  
Arbitrage Opportunity ◽  
Public Offering ◽  
Abnormal Profits ◽  
Fundamental Theorems ◽  
To Receive

We propose a solution to the closed-end fund puzzle in financial markets without a free lunch with vanishing risk. Our results are consistent with both the time-series and the cross-sectional aspect of the closed-end fund puzzle. It turns out that a closed-end fund cannot exist if the fund manager is supposed to receive a fee although he is not able to find mispriced assets in the market. By contrast, a premium can typically be observed at the initial public offering because the fund manager has access to information that enables him to create a dominant strategy. As soon as this weak arbitrage opportunity evaporates, a premium can no longer occur. The reason why a premium quickly turns into a discount might be that the fund manager stops applying a superior trading strategy at some point in time. Another possibility is that abnormal profits are transient in a competitive financial market. In any case, when the fund manager is no longer willing or able to maintain a superior strategy, the fund must trade at a discount in order to compensate for his management fee.

scholarly journals Daily abnormal price changes and trading strategies in the FOREX

2020 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 211-222
Author(s):  
Guglielmo Maria Caporale ◽  
Alex Plastun
Keyword(s):  
Design Methodology ◽  
Abnormal Returns ◽  
Trading Strategies ◽  
Price Changes ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Cumulative Abnormal Returns ◽  
Market Inefficiency ◽  
Intraday Data ◽  
Abnormal Profits ◽  
New Evidence

PurposeThis paper explores abnormal price changes in the FOREX by using both daily and intraday data on the EURUSD, USDJPY, USDCAD, AUDUSD and EURJPY exchange rates over the period 01.01.2008–31.12.2018.Design/methodology/approachIt applies a dynamic trigger approach to detect abnormal price changes and then various statistical methods, including cumulative abnormal returns analysis, to test the following hypotheses: the intraday behaviour of hourly returns on overreaction days is different from that on normal days (H1), there are detectable patterns in intraday price dynamics on days with abnormal price changes (H2) and on the following days (H3).FindingsThe results suggest that there are statistically significant differences between intraday dynamics on days with abnormal price changes and normal days respectively; also, prices tend to change in the direction of the abnormal change during that day, but move in the opposite direction on the following day. Finally, there exist trading strategies that generate abnormal profits by exploiting the detected anomalies, which can be seen as evidence of market inefficiency.Originality/valueNew evidence on abnormal price changes and related trading strategies in the FOREX.

To What Extent Do CEOs Matter for Firm Abnormal Profits Sustainability?

2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 (1) ◽  
pp. 14893
Author(s):  
Jian Guan ◽  
Fang Deng ◽  
Dao Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Abnormal Profits

Insider trading surrounding securities class action litigation and settlement announcements

2017 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 124-140 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frederick Davis ◽  
Behzad Taghipour ◽  
Thomas J. Walker
Keyword(s):  
Insider Trading ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Stock Prices ◽  
Class Action ◽  
Market Model ◽  
Trading Activity ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Abnormal Profits ◽  
The Impact

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the trading patterns of corporate insiders, both managing and non-managing, around the announcement dates of securities class action lawsuits and related legal settlements. Design/methodology/approach The authors use market model event study methodology to examine the impact of class action litigation and settlement announcements on the stock prices of sued firms. The authors then determine the extent of abnormal insider trading surrounding such announcements by comparing insider trading activity (volume and transaction counts) to prior insider trading in the same firm, and to a matched sample of firms not experiencing such litigation announcements. A multivariate framework is utilized to provide further insight into the determinants of such abnormal insider trading. Findings The authors establish that class action litigation and settlement announcements have a significant impact on the stock prices of sued firms, and that foreknowledge of these events appears to be used by insiders to earn abnormal profits. Moreover, results indicate that managing insiders exhibit higher opportunistic abnormal trading activity than non-managing insiders. Multivariate analysis shows that size, prior firm returns, and the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act are important determinants of such insider trading. Originality/value This appears to be the first paper to analyze insider trading surrounding class action settlement announcements, and raises concerns about the ethical conduct of certain insider groups while highlighting the importance of access to private information, even amongst insiders themselves.

scholarly journals Hedge Funds, Arbitrage, and Timing

2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 45
Author(s):  
Daniel T. Lawson ◽  
Robert L. Schwartz ◽  
Seth D. Thomas
Keyword(s):  
Hedge Funds ◽  
Small Firms ◽  
Hedge Fund ◽  
Time Varying ◽  
Risk Premiums ◽  
Growth Anomaly ◽  
Asset Pricing Anomalies ◽  
Pricing Anomalies ◽  
Asset Growth ◽  
Abnormal Profits

This paper is an extension of the work of Lawson and Schwartz (2018) which analyzes the risk-adjusted performance of hedge funds by employing a collection of four, five, seven, and eight-factor models. The purpose is to evaluate how well the top and bottom performing subset of hedge fund strategies have profited on known asset pricing anomalies during two unique time periods, 1994 to 2000 and 2001 to 2008. The bifurcation of the data into two distinct periods allows for a deeper exploration of the potential time-varying significance of estimated factor arbitrage. Our empirical testing suggests that both the top and bottom performing funds did utilize the asset growth anomaly to generate abnormal profits. Top performers tended to invest with a long emphasis on low asset growth, value firms while the bottom-five performing hedge fund strategies tested positive for a predilection towards going long small firms with low asset growth characteristics. Arguably, these outcomes probably align with the nature of the investment philosophy of each fund strategy. Interestingly, however, the time-varying significance of estimated coefficients for the value and returns momentum factors between the two distinct timeframes suggests either intentional or unintentional rotation between the use of available pricing anomalies and risk premiums.

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