Do Speculators Exacerbate Managerial Myopia? Evidence from Margin Traders in China

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jun Chen
Keyword(s):  
Managerial Myopia

Does Long-Term Earnings Guidance Mitigate Managerial Myopia?

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew C. Call ◽  
Shuping Chen ◽  
Adam M. Esplin ◽  
Bin Miao
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Guidance ◽  
Managerial Myopia

Knowledge inventories and managerial myopia

2002 ◽  
Vol 23 (8) ◽  
pp. 689-706 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kent D. Miller
Keyword(s):  
Managerial Myopia

scholarly journals Abnormal Loan Growth and Bank Profitability: Some Evidence from the Recent Crisis

2019 ◽  
Vol 14 (7) ◽  
pp. 36
Author(s):  
Simone Rossi ◽  
Mariarosa Borroni ◽  
Mariacristina Piva ◽  
Andrea Lippi
Keyword(s):  
Bank Profitability ◽  
Credit Growth ◽  
Crisis Period ◽  
Managerial Myopia ◽  
Lending Policy ◽  
European Banks ◽  
Loan Growth ◽  
Credit Standards ◽  
The Relationship

During healthy economic/financial times, credit growth often happens without proper provisioning. This is due to a managerial myopia that underestimates the risks underlying an expansive lending policy, leading to lower profitability in following years. However, given the countercyclicality of credit standards, this effect shouldn’t occur during harsh times. In this paper, we analyse the relationship between abnormal credit growth and bank profitability during a crisis period. In particular, we test the hypothesis that during a crisis, abnormal credit growth improves bank profitability, given the need for higher, or at least stable, credit standards. We find support for this assumption using a sample of 101 large European banks observed during the recent crisis period. Results are robust to different robustness checks.

RECTIFYING MANAGERIAL MYOPIA

2014 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 6-6
Author(s):  
Steve Coomber
Keyword(s):  
Managerial Myopia

Why Do Firms Disagree with Short Sellers? Managerial Myopia versus Private Information

2019 ◽  
Vol 55 (8) ◽  
pp. 2431-2465 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leonce Bargeron ◽  
Alice Bonaime
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Trading Strategy ◽  
Short Sellers ◽  
Managerial Myopia ◽  
Agency Issues ◽  
Target Management ◽  
Short Interest ◽  
Short Termism ◽  
Informational Advantage

Though short sellers on average succeed at identifying overvalued equity, firms often signal disagreement with short sellers by repurchasing stock when short interest increases. We investigate whether this disagreement reflects a myopic defense of inflated prices, or positive private information. These repurchases appear motivated by managers’ private information, not agency issues, even when managerial benefits to short-termism are enhanced or monitoring is weaker. Managers’ informational advantage relates to subsequent news, earnings, and risk, but is attenuated if activists target management or insiders sell. A trading strategy based on our findings earns 7.5% annually.

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