Risk as Excuses to Postpone Effort-Provision

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wenbo Zou
Keyword(s):  
Effort Provision

scholarly journals Training and Effort Dynamics in Apprenticeship

2019 ◽  
Vol 109 (11) ◽  
pp. 3780-3812 ◽  
Author(s):  
Drew Fudenberg ◽  
Luis Rayo
Keyword(s):  
Knowledge Transfer ◽  
Task Allocation ◽  
Optimal Time ◽  
Optimal Contract ◽  
Walk Away ◽  
Time Path ◽  
Regulatory Limits ◽  
Effort Provision ◽  
Independent Tasks

A principal specifies time paths of effort provision, task allocation, and knowledge transfer for a cash-constrained apprentice, who is free to walk away at any time. In the optimal contract the apprentice pays for training by working for low or no wages and by working inefficiently hard. The apprentice can work on both knowledge-complementary and knowledge-independent tasks. We study the optimal time path of effort distortions and their impact on the knowledge transfer, and analyze the effect of regulatory limits on the length of apprenticeships and on how much effort apprentices are allowed to provide. (JEL D82, D86, J24, J41, M53)

FRAMING OF INCENTIVES AND EFFORT PROVISION

2015 ◽  
Vol 56 (3) ◽  
pp. 917-938 ◽  
Author(s):  
Olivier Armantier ◽  
Amadou Boly
Keyword(s):  
Effort Provision

scholarly journals Fatter or Fitter? On rewarding and training in a contest

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Derek Clark ◽  
Tore Nilssen
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Selection Problem ◽  
Trade Off ◽  
Heterogeneous Players ◽  
Fixed Budget ◽  
Set Up ◽  
Effort Provision ◽  
And Training

Competition between heterogeneous participants often leads to low effort provision in contests. We consider a principal who can divide her fixed budget between skill-enhancing training and the contest prize. Training can reduce heterogeneity, which increases effort. But it also reduces the contest prize, which makes effort fall. We set up an incomplete-information contest with heterogeneous players and show how this trade-off is related to the size of the budget when the principal maximizes expected effort. A selection problem can also arise in this framework in which there is a cost associated with a contest win by the inferior player. This gives the principal a larger incentive to train the expected laggard, reducing the size of the prize on offer.

scholarly journals Effort Provision in a Game of Luck

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mads Nordmo Arnestad ◽  
Kristoffer W. Eriksen ◽  
Ola Kvaløy ◽  
Bjørnar Laurila
Keyword(s):  
Lab Experiment ◽  
Money Managers ◽  
Effort Provision

In some jobs, the correlation between effort and output is almost zero. For instance, money managers are primarily paid for luck. Using a controlled lab experiment, we examined under which conditions workers are willing to put in effort even if the output (and thus their employer’s earnings) is determined by pure luck. We varied whether the employer could observe the workers’ effort, as well as whether the employer knows that earnings were determined by luck. We find that, workers believed that the employer will reward their effort even if their effort does not affect earnings. Consequently, workers work harder if the employer could observe their (unproductive) effort. Moreover, even when the employer only saw earnings and not effort, workers labored harder if the employer did not know that earnings were determined by luck.

scholarly journals Respon Berbagai Sumber Bahan Stek terhadap Kemampuan Berakar Stek Alstonia scholaris (L) R. Br. sebagai Upaya Penyediaan Bibit untuk Lahan Terdegradasi

2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Kiki Ayunda Putri ◽  
Suwirmen Suwirmen ◽  
Zozy Aneloi Noli
Keyword(s):  
Natural Science ◽  
Degraded Lands ◽  
Science Faculty ◽  
Biology Department ◽  
Rooting Ability ◽  
Alstonia Scholaris ◽  
Randomized Design ◽  
Completely Randomized Design ◽  
Effort Provision

The research about  the respon  of the material cuttings retrieval on rooting ability of  Alstonia scholaris (L.) R. Br. Cuttings  in an effort provision of seeds for Degraded lands ,  conducted from October until December 2015 at Physiology Plant Laboratorium of Biology Department, Mathematics and Natural Science Faculty of Andalas University, Padang. The aim of this research to found the best  material cuttings on A. scholaris. This research used Completely Randomized Design (CRD) method. The treatments were the basal (A), the middle (B), and the apical (C). The results showed that the apical was the best material cuttings, with a average number of roots (3.967), and the average of root dry weights (0.832)g. The conclusion of this research is the that material cuttings of apical is the bst one for Pulai cutting.

scholarly journals First-Place Loving and Last-Place Loathing: How Rank in the Distribution of Performance Affects Effort Provision

2019 ◽  
Vol 65 (2) ◽  
pp. 494-507 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Gill ◽  
Zdenka Kissová ◽  
Jaesun Lee ◽  
Victoria Prowse
Keyword(s):  
Effort Provision
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