A New Indicator of Coalition Size: Tests Against Standard Regime-Type Indicators

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita ◽  
Alastair Smith
2015 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 613-639 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin A.T. Graham ◽  
Erik Gartzke ◽  
Christopher J. Fariss

Studies of regime type and war show that democracies tend to win the wars they fight, but questions remain about why this is the case. A simple, if underappreciated, explanation for democratic success is that democracies fight alongside larger and more powerful coalitions. Coalition partners bring additional material capabilities and may also provide intangible benefits to the war effort, such as increased legitimacy or confidence. Democracies may also find it less costly to join coalitions, as democratic war aims may be easier to apportion among the victors without diluting the spoils. Evaluating our hypotheses in a sample of all wars (or all militarized disputes) during the period 1816–2000, we find that democracies fight alongside larger coalitions and that states fighting alongside larger coalitions are more likely to win major contests. Coalition size subsumes most (and in some specifications all) of the direct effect of regime type on victory.


Author(s):  
Paul Chaisty ◽  
Nic Cheeseman ◽  
Timothy J. Power

This chapter considers how presidents use their budget powers and the allocation of targeted discretionary spending to manage their coalitions. It considers the costs of budget tool deployment (in terms of time, controversy, and economic resources), and the factors that affect these costs: system-level factors (government transparency, federalism, personal-vote elections), coalition-level factors (coalition size, fragmentation, and heterogeneity), and conjunctural factors (economic crises and energy prices). It explores these factors with cases of budget tool deployment in Ukraine, Ecuador, and Russia. The Ecuadorean and Russian cases illustrate the divergent effects of resource dependence on the cost of budget tool dependence. Finally, it uses data from MP surveys to show the high value that legislators attribute to budget tools, and to illustrate how the composition of coalitions affects the costs that presidents are likely to face.


2018 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 178-204
Author(s):  
Anna Jarstad ◽  
Desirée Nilsson

2006 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-39
Author(s):  
BENJAMIN E. GOLDSMITH

Previous research (e.g., Horiuchi, Goldsmith, and Inoguchi, 2005) has shown some intriguing patterns of effects of several variables on international public opinion about US foreign policy. But results for the theoretically appealing effects of regime type and post-materialist values have been weak or inconsistent. This paper takes a closer look at the relationship between these two variables and international public opinion about US foreign policy. In particular, international reaction to the wars in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) are examined using two major multinational surveys. The conclusions of previous research are largely reinforced: neither regime type nor post-materialist values appears to robustly influence global opinion on these events. Rather, some central interests, including levels of trade with the US and NATO membership, and key socialized factors, including a Muslim population, experience with terrorism, and the exceptional experiences of two states (Israel, Albania) emerge as the most important factors in the models. There is also a consistent backlash effect of security cooperation with the US outside of NATO. A discussion of these preliminary results points to their theoretical implications and their significance for further investigation into the transnational dynamics of public opinion and foreign policy.


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