Punish Underperformance with Resting Optimal Dynamic Contracts in the Presence of Switching Cost

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ping Cao ◽  
Peng Sun ◽  
Feng Tian
Keyword(s):  
Switching Cost ◽  
Dynamic Contracts ◽  
Optimal Dynamic

Optimal dynamic contracts with moral hazard and costly monitoring

2016 ◽  
Vol 166 ◽  
pp. 242-281 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tomasz Piskorski ◽  
Mark M. Westerfield
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Dynamic Contracts ◽  
Costly Monitoring ◽  
Optimal Dynamic

Phasic Alertness and the Residual Task-Switching Cost

2005 ◽  
Vol 52 (2) ◽  
pp. 109-124 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nachshon Meiran ◽  
Ziv Chorev
Keyword(s):  
Task Switching ◽  
Target Stimulus ◽  
Switching Cost ◽  
Optimal Interval ◽  
Phasic Alertness ◽  
Goal Representation

Abstract. Participants switched between two randomly ordered discrimination tasks and each trial began with the presentation of a task cue instructing which task to execute. The authors induced phasic alertness by presenting a salient uninformative stimulus after the task cue was provided, and at variable intervals before the target stimulus was presented (Experiments 1-3) or before the task cue (Experiment 4). When the alerting stimulus preceded the target stimulus or the task cue by an optimal interval, RT was faster, indicating an alert state and the task-switching cost was reduced. These results support the suggestion of De Jong (Acta Psychologica, 1999 ) that alertness improves the overcoming of retrieval competition through improved goal representation, but also show that the effect is specific to the residual task-switching cost.

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