Evidence Games: Lying Aversion and Commitment

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elif Osun ◽  
Erkut Ozbay
Keyword(s):  
2018 ◽  
Vol 108 (2) ◽  
pp. 419-453 ◽  
Author(s):  
Uri Gneezy ◽  
Agne Kajackaite ◽  
Joel Sobel

This paper studies lying. An agent randomly picks a number from a known distribution. She can then report any number and receive a monetary payoff based only on her report. The paper presents a model of lying costs that generates hypotheses regarding behavior. In an experiment, we find that the highest fraction of lies is from reporting the maximal outcome, but some participants do not make the maximal lie. More participants lie partially when the experimenter cannot observe their outcomes than when the experimenter can verify the observed outcome. Partial lying increases when the prior probability of the highest outcome decreases. (JEL C91, D12, D90, Z13)


Author(s):  
Uri Gneezy ◽  
Agne Kajackaite ◽  
Joel Sobel
Keyword(s):  

2015 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 663-685 ◽  
Author(s):  
Valeria Maggian ◽  
Marie Claire Villeval

Author(s):  
Laura Biziou-van-Pol ◽  
Jana Haenen ◽  
Arianna Novaro ◽  
Andrrs Occhipinti Liberman ◽  
Valerio Capraro

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Valeria Maggian ◽  
Marie Claire Villeval

2020 ◽  
Vol 41 (4) ◽  
pp. 651-657
Author(s):  
Ann‐Kathrin Crede ◽  
Frauke Bieberstein
Keyword(s):  

2008 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 180-192 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sjaak Hurkens ◽  
Navin Kartik

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