Industrial Organization of Health Care Markets

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin Handel ◽  
Kate Ho
Keyword(s):  
Health Care ◽  
Industrial Organization ◽  
Health Care Markets

The Industrial Organization of Health-Care Markets

2015 ◽  
Vol 53 (2) ◽  
pp. 235-284 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Gaynor ◽  
Kate Ho ◽  
Robert J. Town
Keyword(s):  
Health Care ◽  
Industrial Organization ◽  
Health Care Providers ◽  
Affordable Care Act ◽  
Health Care Spending ◽  
Health Care Markets ◽  
Care Providers ◽  
Patient Protection ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The U.S

The U.S. health-care sector is large and growing—health-care spending in 2011 amounted to $2.7 trillion and 18 percent of GDP. Approximately half of health-care output is allocated via markets. In this paper, we analyze the industrial organization literature on health-care markets, focusing on the impact of competition on price, quality, and treatment decisions for health-care providers and health insurers. We conclude with a discussion of research opportunities for industrial organization economists, including opportunities created by the U.S. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. (JEL J15, J24, J71, J81, K31)

scholarly journals Competition and equity in health care markets

2019 ◽  
Vol 64 ◽  
pp. 1-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luigi Siciliani ◽  
Odd Rune Straume
Keyword(s):  
Health Care ◽  
Health Care Markets ◽  
Equity In Health ◽  
Equity In Health Care

scholarly journals Equilibrium Provider Networks: Bargaining and Exclusion in Health Care Markets

2019 ◽  
Vol 109 (2) ◽  
pp. 473-522 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kate Ho ◽  
Robin S. Lee
Keyword(s):  
Health Care ◽  
Consumer Welfare ◽  
Bargaining Solution ◽  
Health Care Markets ◽  
Social Incentives ◽  
Provider Networks ◽  
Hospital Networks ◽  
Private Incentives ◽  
Social Surplus ◽  
Optimal Networks

We evaluate the consequences of narrow hospital networks in commercial health care markets. We develop a bargaining solution, “Nash-in-Nash with Threat of Replacement,” that captures insurers’ incentives to exclude, and combine it with California data and estimates from Ho and Lee (2017) to simulate equilibrium outcomes under social, consumer, and insurer-optimal networks. Private incentives to exclude generally exceed social incentives, as the insurer benefits from substantially lower negotiated hospital rates. Regulation prohibiting exclusion increases prices and premiums and lowers consumer welfare without significantly affecting social surplus. However, regulation may prevent harm to consumers living close to excluded hospitals. (JEL C78, D85, G22, H75, I11, I13, I18)

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