Revealing Private Information in a Patent Race

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pavel Kocourek
2002 ◽  
Vol 04 (04) ◽  
pp. 415-434 ◽  
Author(s):  
HANS HALLER ◽  
ANTHONY PAVLOPOULOS

A research lab has private information about failed test results. There is a finite group of potential participants in a patent race to whom this information is valuable, since it reduces research costs. The lab acts as a Stackelberg leader in a strategic game of informational rent extraction. The lab's optimum is also (constrained) socially optimal in that the lab sells all its information to all the firms. Posting a uniform per unit (per test result) price suffices to achieve that outcome.


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