The Distributional Effect of Market Power and its Implications for Inclusive Growth in Korea

Zakat is an annual religious levy that is collected from rich Muslims and its proceeds are disbursed among poor people of the society. It has many spiritual and social merits. For example, it purifies the hearts of zakat-givers as they give away a part of their wealth, one of the most precious things in their lives, seeking the pleasure of God without requiring any worldly gains whatsoever. It bridges the social gap between „haves‟ and „have-nots.‟ This study analyses, however, only economic consequences of Zakat for economic growth. They cannot be appreciated duly unless one understands the following concepts of modern economics; various theories of consumption, aggregate demand, stagnation thesis, consumption puzzle, marginal productivity of capital and Kuznets curve.

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Vertical Boilerplate

10.31228/osf.io/svk6p ◽

2017 ◽

Author(s):

James Gibson

Keyword(s):

Market Power ◽

Real World ◽

Empirical Work ◽

Full Scale ◽

Market Mechanism ◽

Law School ◽

Information Cost ◽

Information Costs ◽

Policy Proposals ◽

Radical Solution

Despite what we learn in law school about the “meeting of the minds,” most contracts are merely boilerplate—take-it-or-leave-it propositions. Negotiation is nonexistent; we rely on our collective market power as consumers to regulate contracts’ content. But boilerplate imposes certain information costs because it often arrives late in the transaction and is hard to understand. If those costs get too high, then the market mechanism fails. So how high are boilerplate’s information costs? A few studies have attempted to measure them, but they all use a “horizontal” approach—i.e., they sample a single stratum of boilerplate and assume that it represents the whole transaction. Yet real-world transactions often involve multiple layers of contracts, each with its own information costs. What is needed, then, is a “vertical” analysis, a study that examines fewer contracts of any one kind but tracks all the contracts the consumer encounters, soup to nuts. This Article presents the first vertical study of boilerplate. It casts serious doubt on the market mechanism and shows that existing scholarship fails to appreciate the full scale of the information cost problem. It then offers two regulatory solutions. The first works within contract law’s unconscionability doctrine, tweaking what the parties need to prove and who bears the burden of proving it. The second, more radical solution involves forcing both sellers and consumers to confront and minimize boilerplate’s information costs—an approach I call “forced salience.” In the end, the boilerplate experience is as deep as it is wide. Our empirical work should reflect that fact, and our policy proposals should too.

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