Does Informative Opposition Influence Electoral Accountability?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Satoshi Kasamatsu ◽  
Daiki Kishishita
Keyword(s):  
Electoral Accountability

When Marriage Gets Hard: Intra-Coalition Conflict and Electoral Accountability

2021 ◽  
pp. 001041402110243
Author(s):  
Carolina Plescia ◽  
Sylvia Kritzinger
Keyword(s):  
Economic Performance ◽  
Political Representation ◽  
Economic Evaluations ◽  
Responsibility Attribution ◽  
Electoral Accountability ◽  
Individual Level ◽  
Coalition Governments ◽  
Level Data ◽  
European Election ◽  
Election Studies

Combining individual-level with event-level data across 25 European countries and three sets of European Election Studies, this study examines the effect of conflict between parties in coalition government on electoral accountability and responsibility attribution. We find that conflict increases punishment for poor economic performance precisely because it helps clarify to voters parties’ actions and responsibilities while in office. The results indicate that under conditions of conflict, the punishment is equal for all coalition partners when they share responsibility for poor economic performance. When there is no conflict within a government, the effect of poor economic evaluations on vote choice is rather low, with slightly more punishment targeted to the prime minister’s party. These findings have important implications for our understanding of electoral accountability and political representation in coalition governments.

The Element of Surprise: Election Timing and Opposition Preparedness

2021 ◽  
pp. 001041402199717
Author(s):  
Charles T. McClean
Keyword(s):  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Fixed Effects ◽  
Conventional Wisdom ◽  
Economic Conditions ◽  
Alternative Mechanism ◽  
Election Campaigns ◽  
Electoral Accountability ◽  
Fixed Effects Models ◽  
Level Data ◽  
Election Timing

How can incumbent governments benefit when they control the timing of elections? The conventional wisdom is that incumbents gain an advantage by timing elections to coincide with favorable economic conditions. An alternative mechanism that has received less attention is the element of surprise: the incumbent’s ability to exploit the opposition’s lack of election preparedness. I theorize and empirically test this surprise mechanism using candidate-level data from Japanese House of Representatives elections (1955–2017). The results show that in surprise elections, opposition parties recruit fewer, lower-quality candidates, spend less money campaigning, coordinate their candidates less effectively, and ultimately receive fewer votes and seats. Evidence from fixed effects models and exogenously timed by-elections further suggest that surprise matters more in shorter, competitive election campaigns and helps incumbents more with confronting inter-party as opposed to intra-party electoral competition. These findings add to our understanding of how strategic election timing can undermine electoral accountability.

Safeguarding Democracy: Powersharing and Democratic Survival

2017 ◽  
Vol 111 (4) ◽  
pp. 686-704 ◽  
Author(s):  
BENJAMIN A.T. GRAHAM ◽  
MICHAEL K. MILLER ◽  
KAARE W. STRØM
Keyword(s):  
Minority Group ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Civil Conflict ◽  
Civilian Control ◽  
Electoral Accountability ◽  
Emerging Democracies ◽  
Post Conflict ◽  
Ethnic Quotas ◽  
Democratic Survival ◽  
Constitutional Protections

Democracy is often fragile, especially in states recovering from civil conflict. To protect emerging democracies, many scholars and practitioners recommend political powersharing institutions, which aim to safeguard minority group interests. Yet there is little empirical research on whether powersharing promotes democratic survival, and some concern that it limits electoral accountability. To fill this gap, we differentiate between inclusive, dispersive, and constraining powersharing institutions and analyze their effects on democratic survival from 1975 to 2015 using a global dataset. We find sharp distinctions across types of powersharing and political context. Inclusive powersharing, such as ethnic quotas, promotes democratic survival only in post-conflict settings. In contrast, dispersive institutions such as federalism tend to destabilize post-conflict democracies. Only constraining powersharing consistently facilitates democratic survival regardless of recent conflict. Institution-builders and international organizations should therefore prioritize institutions that constrain leaders, including independent judiciaries, civilian control of the armed forces, and constitutional protections of individual and group rights.

scholarly journals Inequality and Electoral Accountability: Class-Biased Economic Voting in Comparative Perspective

2016 ◽  
Vol 78 (4) ◽  
pp. 1076-1093 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy Hicks ◽  
Alan M. Jacobs ◽  
J. Scott Matthews
Keyword(s):  
Economic Voting ◽  
Comparative Perspective ◽  
Electoral Accountability
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