Sources of Gains in Horizontal Mergers: Evidence from Customer, Supplier, and Rival Firms

2003 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. Edward Edward Fee ◽  
Shawn E. Thomas
Keyword(s):  
Horizontal Mergers ◽  
Rival Firms

Antitrust and horizontal mergers in the cable industry

1988 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 3-28 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sylvia M. Chan‐Olmsted ◽  
Barry R. Litman
Keyword(s):  
Horizontal Mergers ◽  
Cable Industry

Will rivals enter or wait outside when faced with litigation risk? Patent litigation in complex product industries and international market entry

2021 ◽  
pp. 147612702199825
Author(s):  
Ergun Onoz ◽  
Claudio Giachetti
Keyword(s):  
Market Entry ◽  
International Market ◽  
Joint Effect ◽  
Litigation Risk ◽  
Patent Litigation ◽  
Complex Product ◽  
Patent Strategy ◽  
Negative Effect ◽  
Rival Firms ◽  
The Relationship

A spiral of patent infringement litigation among rival firms is a phenomenon often observed in complex product industries, where products comprise numerous separately patentable elements. Theoretically grounded in the awareness–motivation–capability framework of competitive dynamics, this article contributes to the literature on patent strategy and international market entry by looking at how, in a complex product industry, the intensity of patent litigation in a country affects a firm’s decision to enter that country. Our results show that the intensity of patent litigation in a country is a deterrent for potential entrants and has a negative effect on a firm’s likelihood of entering that country. We also show that a firm’s previous experience with patent litigation ( awareness component), the share of a firm’s current patent applications in a target country ( motivation component), and the size of a firm’s patent stock ( capability component) moderate the relationship between a country’s patent litigation intensity and a firm’s likelihood of entering that country. We thus shed light on the joint effect of macro- and micro-level patent-related variables on a firm’s market entry decisions. We test our hypotheses with a comprehensive panel of patenting and entry strategies of 84 mobile phone vendors and their patent litigation battles in 45 countries, from 2003 to 2015.

The 1984 justice department guidelines toward horizontal mergers

1986 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-77 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donald L. Bumpass ◽  
Patricia J. Nichol
Keyword(s):  
Horizontal Mergers ◽  
Justice Department

Upward Pricing Pressure in Horizontal Merger Analysis: Reply to Epstein and Rubinfeld

2010 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Farrell ◽  
Carl Shapiro
Keyword(s):  
Horizontal Merger ◽  
Horizontal Mergers ◽  
Merger Analysis

We reply here to a comment by Epstein and Rubinfeld to our paper on the antitrust evaluation of horizontal mergers.

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