Household Debt Overhang Did Hardly Cause a Larger Spending Fall During the Financial Crisis in the UK

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lars E.O. Svensson
2020 ◽  
Vol 89 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-114
Author(s):  
Damon Gibbons

Summary: In the wake of the Global Financial Crisis, a significant research effort has been made to better understand the links between household debt levels, financial stability risks, and the ongoing implications of the ‘debt overhang’ for economic growth. However, accurately measuring the household debt burden remains problematic. Aggregate measures of household indebtedness (e. g. household liabilities relative to income) fail to fully capture the debt servicing burdens of households, particularly in periods when real incomes are declining (as has been the case in the UK in recent years). They also provide no insight into the distribution of debt burdens, which may be important for both future financial stability and economic growth. We attempt to address this problem by combining a new analysis of aggregate data with insights gleaned from household debt surveys. We first construct a new measure of debt interest payments as a percentage of the overall household surplus from the aggregate data. This indicates a significant increase in household debt burdens between 2016 and 2018. We test the validity of this measure by analysing household debt surveys over the period, and report on the most affected households. The findings support a case for a lowering of the thresholds used in official measures of financial vulnerability and over-indebtedness and for greater impetus in policymaking to relieve the financial pressures of households in debt.


Author(s):  
Chase Foster

Since the global financial crisis, European governments have sought to intensify the supervision of financial markets. Yet, few studies have empirically examined whether regulatory approaches have systematically shifted in the aftermath of the crisis, and how these reforms have been mediated by longstanding national strategies to promote domestic financial interests in the European single market. Examining hundreds of enforcement actions in three key European jurisdictions, I find a mixed pattern of continuity and change in the aftermath of the crisis. In the UK, aggregate monetary penalties and criminal sanctions have skyrocketed since 2009, while in France and Germany, the enforcement pattern suggests continuity, with both countries assessing penalties and prosecuting insider trading at similar rates before and after the crisis. I conclude that financial regulation is still structured by longstanding industrial strategies (Story and Walter, 1997), but where pre-existing regulatory approaches were seen as contributing to the crisis, a broader regulatory overhaul has been pursued. Thus, in the UK, where the financial crisis served as a direct rebuke to the country’s “light touch” regulation, financial supervision was overhauled, and monetary sanctions dramatically increased, to preserve London’s status as an international financial centre. By contrast, in France and Germany, where domestic regulatory systems were implicated by the financial crisis, domestic securities supervision and enforcement was less dramatically altered. While the crisis has led to the further institutionalization of European-level supervisory institutions, these changes have not yet led to convergence in national regulatory approaches.   Full text available at: https://doi.org/10.22215/rera.v12i1.1233


Author(s):  
Oonagh McDonald

This chapter traces the history of financial regulation in the UK. It challenges the widely held belief that the period from the 1980s witnessed a systematic process of deregulation. In fact, from the 1970s there was a period of increasing regulation up until the mid-2000s, when the government began to encourage a ‘light touch’ approach. The combination of all these factors meant that banks were ill-prepared to meet the financial crisis. In its aftermath, as the banks embarked on the slow path to recovery, making profits was essential. The traders seized any opportunity they could, and it may well be the case that banks were simply relieved that some areas of their business were profitable.


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