Competition Law and Political Influence of Large Corporations – Antitrust Analysis and the Link between Political and Economic Institutions

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francisco Beneke
Keyword(s):  
Competition Law ◽  
Political Influence ◽  
Economic Institutions ◽  
Large Corporations ◽  
Antitrust Analysis

scholarly journals The Influence of Economic Theories and Schools on Competition Law in terms of Vertical Agreements

2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (18) ◽  
pp. 153-180
Author(s):  
Zbigniew Jurczyk
Keyword(s):  
Competition Policy ◽  
Evaluation Criteria ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Chicago School ◽  
Antitrust Law ◽  
Competitive Effects ◽  
Economic Theories ◽  
The Past ◽  
Antitrust Analysis ◽  
Harvard School

The paper aims at showing the influence and the views espoused by economic theories and schools of economics on competition policy embedded in antitrust law and conducted by competition authorities in the field of vertical agreements. The scope of the paper demonstrates how substantially the economization of antitrust law has changed the assessment as to the harmfulness of vertical agreements. The analysis of economic aspects of vertical agreements in antitrust analysis allows one to reveal their pro-competitive effects and benefits, with the consumer being their beneficiary. The basic instrument of the said economization is that antitrust bodies draw on specific economic models and theories that can be employed in their practice. Within the scope of the paper, the author synthesizes the role and influence of those models and schools of economics on the application of competition law in the context of vertical agreements. In presenting, one after another, the theories and schools of economics which used to, or are still dealing with competition policy the author emphasises that in its nature this impact was more or less direct. Some of them remain at the level of general principals and axiology of competition policy, while others, in contrast, delineate concrete evaluation criteria and show how the application of those criteria changes the picture of anti-competitive practices; in other words, why vertical agreements, which in the past used to be considered to restrain competition, are no longer perceived as such. The paper presents the models and recommendations of neoclassical economics, the Harvard School, the Chicago and Post-Chicago School, the ordoliberal school, the Austrian and neoAustrian school as well as the transaction cost theory.

scholarly journals Towards a Political Theory of the Firm

2017 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 113-130 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luigi Zingales
Keyword(s):  
Public Relations ◽  
Political Theory ◽  
Theory Of The Firm ◽  
Political Influence ◽  
Vicious Circle ◽  
Legal Power ◽  
The Us ◽  
Large Corporations ◽  
National Governments ◽  
Elected Representatives

The revenues of large companies often rival those of national governments, and some companies have annual revenues higher than many national governments. Among the largest corporations in 2015, some had private security forces that rivaled the best secret services, public relations offices that dwarfed a US presidential campaign headquarters, more lawyers than the US Justice Department, and enough money to capture (through campaign donations, lobbying, and even explicit bribes) a majority of the elected representatives. The only powers these large corporations missed were the power to wage war and the legal power of detaining people, although their political influence was sufficiently large that many would argue that, at least in certain settings, large corporations can exercise those powers by proxy. Yet in economics, the commonly prevailing view of the firm ignores all these elements of politics and power. We must recognize that large firms have considerable power to influence the rules of the game. I call attention to the risk of a “Medici vicious circle,” in which economic and political power reinforce each other. The possibility and extent of a “Medici vicious circle” depends upon several nonmarket factors. I discuss how they should be incorporated in a broader “Political Theory” of the firm.

scholarly journals Economic and Legal Features of Digital Markets

2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 173-183
Author(s):  
Rastislav Funta
Keyword(s):  
Social Networks ◽  
Economic Activity ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Business Models ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Digital Transformation ◽  
The Other ◽  
Policy Statements ◽  
New Challenges ◽  
Antitrust Analysis

Abstract Digitization has changed economic activity in many ways. While digitization has contributed to a very dynamic development of markets and competition, concerns are also being expressed about powerful positions of some companies. The digital transformation poses new challenges for companies, consumers, politics and society. Competition policy is also required to address these developments and to adapt existing competition law, if necessary. The following analysis of digital markets showed that it is not possible, in general, to make concrete competition policy statements or even to give detailed recommendations for the antitrust analysis. The aspects are to be considered separately and in detail when examining search engines, social networks, trading platforms and other business models. On the other hand, data (and data analysis) should stand in the centre of competition law analysis due to their importance for the economic success of digital market companies.

scholarly journals Competition Law in Australia of Section 46

2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Xinxin Jia
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Law And Policy ◽  
Large Corporations ◽  
The Impact

In 2016-2017 a landmark change was observed. The Competition and Consumer Act 2010 was amended in relation to Section 46 with the aim of strengthening the Competition law and policy in Australia and keep large corporations in check[1-2]. This essay will examine the impact of the replacement of the misuse of market power provision in old Section 46 with the effects test in the amended Act[3]. The purpose and impact of substantial lessening of competition under Section 46 would thus be examined with reference to case law and articles[4]

scholarly journals Digitale Marktmacht

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maximilian Volmar
Keyword(s):  
Business Models ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Political Influence ◽  
The Internet ◽  
Dominant Position ◽  
Digital Platforms ◽  
The Us ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
A Company ◽  
The Eu

The ascending economic and political influence of the internet platforms of the 21st century has sparked a debate about the adequate regulation of these “tech titans”. At the heart of this discussion is competition law – the field of law that was created to tame dominant companies. But when does a company truly hold such a “dominant position”? The definition of this fundamental competition law term faces numerous challenges when applied to digital platforms, from zero-price markets to the multi-sidedness of business models. This book dismantles the term into its components and shows where the methodology needs to adapt to the digital economy. In doing so, it considers the legal regimes of Germany, the EU and the US, as well as findings from legal economics.

scholarly journals The Role of Economic Efficiency in Competition Law

2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (16) ◽  
pp. 127-153
Author(s):  
Zbigniew Jurczyk
Keyword(s):  
Economic Efficiency ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Consumer Welfare ◽  
Dynamic Efficiency ◽  
Current Application ◽  
Dominant Position ◽  
Evaluation Standard ◽  
The Us ◽  
Antitrust Analysis

The main focus of the paper is the function of economics in the current application of competition law. While advocating further economization of the law, it is seen as necessary to widen the extent to which aspects of economic efficiency encompassing static and dynamic efficiency are taken into consideration in an antitrust analysis. Much attention is devoted to these issues, while clarifying what is meant by them, how they are to be understood and implemented in the practice of antitrust authorities, as well as discussing their importance for the promotion of innovation. It is noted that accounting for the economic efficiency aspects differently in the light of competition law allows for the assessment of the market behavior of dominant companies, which traditionally has been seen as anticompetitive. This main issue of the paper is analyzed extensively and explained using the case of Microsoft, a company accused by the US and EU antitrust authorities of abusing its dominant position on the market of operating systems in that it integrated the sale of its base product Windows OS exclusively with other applications (Media Player and Internet Explorer). The differences presented in the research part of the paper as to the way Microsoft was treated by these authorities originated in their different methodology of analysis and assessment of the effects of the sales model launched by Microsoft for products offered to the PC manufacturers and their users, in spite of the US and EU antitrust authorities adopting the same evaluation standard – consumer welfare. Aspects of dynamic efficiency adequate in the assessment of the behavior of innovative firms holding a dominant position proved to be deciding. On the other side of the Atlantic, taking into account the aspects of dynamic efficiency was crucial in coming up with a lighter assessment of Microsoft’s tying compared to the European authorities’ assessment which was based largely on the structural analysis, where the benefits arising from dynamic efficiency are not visible. It is clear from the decisions made by the Commission that it favours regulation over effects generated by competition forces at a later time.

Antitrust: U.S. Supreme Court Affirms FTC Jurisdiction but Vacates Scope of Analysis on CDA Policy

1999 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 197-198
Author(s):  
Joseph R. Zakhary
Keyword(s):  
Public Relations ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Federal Trade Commission ◽  
Ninth Circuit ◽  
Court Of Appeals ◽  
For Profit ◽  
Rule Of Reason ◽  
Antitrust Analysis ◽  
Business Financing ◽  
The U.S

In California Dental Association v. FTC, 119 S. Ct. 1604 (1999), the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed a decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that a nonprofit affiliation of dentists violated section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA), 15 U.S.C.A. § 45 (1998), which prohibits unfair competition. The Court examined two issues: (1) the Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) jurisdiction over the California Dental Association (CDA); and (2) the proper scope of antitrust analysis. The Court unanimously held that CDA was subject to FTC's jurisdiction, but split 5-4 in its finding that the district court's use of abbreviated rule-of-reason analysis was inappropriate.CDA is a voluntary, nonprofit association of local dental societies. It boasts approximately 19,000 members, who constitute roughly threequarters of the dentists practicing in California. Although a nonprofit, CDA includes for-profit subsidiaries that financially benefit CDA members. CDA gives its members access to insurance and business financing, and lobbies and litigates on their behalf. Members also benefit from CDA marketing and public relations campaigns.

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