Strategic Incentives in Non-Coasean Litigation

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erik Hovenkamp ◽  
Steven C. Salop
Keyword(s):  
2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 662-676 ◽  
Author(s):  
Denis Cohen

AbstractWhat attracts voters to far-right parties? Emphasizing the repercussions of far-right parties' past achievements on the mobilization of voters' electoral demand, this paper develops an argument of context-dependent strategic far-right voting. Far-right parties seek to mobilize on a combination of demand for nativist policies and anti-establishment protest sentiment. Their capacity of doing so, however, critically depends on the strategic incentives they supply. My findings from a comparative analysis based on six waves of the European Election Study show that far-right parties' past attainment of legislative strength boosts the credibility of their policy appeal and broadens the scope of their protest appeal whereas their participation in government jeopardizes their capacity to mobilize on popular discontent.


2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Dermot Leahy ◽  
Catia Montagna

AbstractWe bridge the organisational economics and industrial economics literatures on the vertical boundaries of the firm by contextualising the transaction cost approach to the make-or-buy decision within an oligopolistic market structure. Firms invest in the quality of the intermediate resulting in the endogenous determination of the price of the intermediate and marginal production cost of the final good. We highlight new strategic incentives to outsource and/or vertically integrate and show how these incentives can result in asymmetric-mode-of-operations, investment and costs. We apply our model to a number of different international trading setups.


2020 ◽  
Vol 114 (3) ◽  
pp. 691-706
Author(s):  
CAITLIN AINSLEY ◽  
CLIFFORD J. CARRUBBA ◽  
BRIAN F. CRISP ◽  
BETUL DEMIRKAYA ◽  
MATTHEW J. GABEL ◽  
...  

Roll-call votes provide scholars with the opportunity to measure many quantities of interest. However, the usefulness of the roll-call sample depends on the population it is intended to represent. After laying out why understanding the sample properties of the roll-call record is important, we catalogue voting procedures for 145 legislative chambers, finding that roll calls are typically discretionary. We then consider two arguments for discounting the potential problem: (a) roll calls are ubiquitous, especially where the threshold for invoking them is low or (b) the strategic incentives behind requests are sufficiently benign so as to generate representative samples. We address the first defense with novel empirical evidence regarding roll-call prevalence and the second with an original formal model of the position-taking argument for roll-call vote requests. Both our empirical and theoretical results confirm that inattention to vote method selection should broadly be considered an issue for the study of legislative behavior.


2018 ◽  
Vol 51 (14) ◽  
pp. 1974-2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sara Watson ◽  
Raj Arunachalam

How should we understand business interests in the welfare state when firms have strategic incentives to misrepresent their preferences? This article uses an event study to uncover firms’ preferences over social protection. We use the stock market’s response to proposed legal changes in employment and wage protection to test class- versus skill-based understandings of employer preferences. Using data from France between 1997 and 2003, we find evidence in favor of the skill-centered approach.


2019 ◽  
Vol 50 (4) ◽  
pp. 1459-1480 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua Tschantret

AbstractWhy do unthreatening social groups become targets of state repression? Repression of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) people is especially puzzling since sexual minorities, unlike many ethnic minorities, pose no credible violent challenge to the state. This article contends that revolutionary governments are disproportionately oppressive toward sexual minorities for strategic and ideological reasons. Since revolutions create domestic instability, revolutionaries face unique strategic incentives to target ‘unreliable’ groups and to demonstrate an ability to selectively punish potential dissidents by identifying and punishing ‘invisible’ groups. Moreover, revolutionary governments are frequently helmed by elites with exclusionary ideologies – such as communism, fascism and Islamism – which represent collectivities rather than individuals. Elites adhering to these views are thus likely to perceive sexual minorities as liberal, individualistic threats to their collectivist projects. Statistical analysis using original data on homophobic repression demonstrates that revolutionary governments are more likely to target LGBT individuals, and that this effect is driven by exclusionary ideologues. Case study evidence from Cuba further indicates that the posited strategic and ideological mechanisms mediate the relationship between revolutionary government and homophobic repression.


2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 195-224 ◽  
Author(s):  
Liran Einav ◽  
Amy Finkelstein ◽  
Raymond Kluender ◽  
Paul Schrimpf

“Big data” and statistical techniques to score potential transactions have transformed insurance and credit markets. In this paper, we observe that these widely-used statistical scores summarize a much richer heterogeneity, and may be endogenous to the context in which they get applied. We demonstrate this point empirically using data from Medicare Part D, showing that risk scores confound underlying health and endogenous spending response to insurance. We then illustrate theoretically that when individuals have heterogeneous behavioral responses to contracts, strategic incentives for cream-skimming can still exist, even in the presence of “perfect” risk scoring under a given contract. (JEL C55, G22, G28, H51, I13)


1993 ◽  
Vol 45 (4) ◽  
pp. 501-525 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donald Crone

The timing and nature of an emerging Pacific economic regime are examined within a framework that extends existing understandings of regime formation. One analytic level is provided by the dynamic nature of states' strategic incentives, as they change from a pattern characterized by extreme hegemony toward one exhibiting features of a more balanced power distribution. Cultural underpinnings of regime values is another. Together, these explain features of Pacific regime formation that otherwise appear anomalous: its delayed emergence, its central internal tensions, and its weakness.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document