scholarly journals Will the Centralisation of Carbon Pricing Revenue in the EU Lead to Laxer Climate Policy?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clemens Fuest ◽  
Volker Meier
Keyword(s):  
2020 ◽  
Vol 251 ◽  
pp. R13-R24
Author(s):  
Milan Elkerbout

Carbon pricing has been the most prominent climate change mitigation policy for the EU since the launch of its emissions trading system (ETS) in 2005. Since then, the context of international climate policy as well as of the socio-political and economical context of decarbonisation has changed considerably. The 2015 Paris Agreement engages virtually every country unlike its predecessor, while non-carbon pricing policies have led to rapid cost reductions in renewables, even if other sectors (particularly in energy-intensive industry) have not seen similar developments. This paper examines how the role of carbon pricing in the EU climate policy mix has evolved from its beginnings as a means to help achieve modest targets under the Kyoto Protocol, to a policy instrument increasingly augmented by a wider policy mix aimed at reaching no net emissions of greenhouse gases by mid-century.


2012 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 81-96
Author(s):  
Małgorzata Burchard-Dziubińska

The text analyses the influence of the EU climate policy on the competitiveness pollution-generating of sectors of the Polish economy. Study of literature and the results of the questionnaire survey, carried out in 2008 in enterprises located in Poland and representing the steel, glass, aluminium and cement industries became a basis for formulating conclusions concerning the consequences of the climate policy already implemented and planned after 2012. The EU climate policy, particularly the common system of emission allowances trade, makes the enterprises face new developmental barriers. The expected increase in production costs will not only slow down the production dynamics, but may also entail lowering the competitiveness of Polish companies compared to companies from outside the EU, to which the greenhouse gasses emission limits do not apply. Adverse consequences for employment and for regional development should also be considered indisputable. If that was accompanied by an emission leakage outside the EU, achieving the global purposes of the climate policy would also become questionable. The businesses surveyed represent industries which are pollution generators by their nature and even ecologically-oriented technological progress is incapable of ensuring considerable emission reductions without general switching of the economy to renewable energy sources.


2021 ◽  
Vol 73 (05) ◽  
pp. 8-8
Author(s):  
Pam Boschee

Carbon credits, carbon taxes, and emissions trading systems are familiar terms in discussions about limiting global warming, the Paris Agreement, and net-zero emissions goals. A more recent addition to the glossary of climate policy is “carbon tariff.” While the concept is not new, it recently surfaced in nascent policymaking in the EU. In 2019, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen proposed a “carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM)” as part of a proposed green deal. In March, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on a World Trade Organization (WTO)-compatible CBAM. A carbon tariff, or the EU’s CBAM, is a tax applied to carbon-intensive imports. Countries that have pledged to be more ambitious in reducing emissions—and in some cases have implemented binding targets—may impose carbon costs on their own businesses. Being eyed now are cross-border or overseas businesses that make products in countries in which no costs are imposed for emissions, resulting in cheaper carbon-intensive goods. Those products are exported to the countries aiming for reduced emissions. The concern lies in the risk of locally made goods becoming unfairly disadvantaged against competitors that are not taking similar steps to deal with climate change. A carbon tariff is being considered to level the playing field: local businesses in countries applying a tariff can better compete as climate policies evolve and are adopted around the world. Complying with WTO rules to ensure fair treatment, the CBAM will be imposed only on high-emitting industries that compete directly with local industries paying a carbon price. In the short term, these are likely to be steel, chemicals, fertilizers, and cement. The Parliament’s statement introduced another term to the glossary of climate policy: carbon leakage. “To raise global climate ambition and prevent ‘carbon leakage,’ the EU must place a carbon price on imports from less climate-ambitious countries.” It refers to the situation that may occur if businesses were to transfer production to other countries with laxer emission constraints to avoid costs related to climate policies. This could lead to an increase in total emissions in the higher-emitting countries. “The resolution underlines that the EU’s increased ambition on climate change must not lead to carbon leakage as global climate efforts will not benefit if EU production is just moved to non-EU countries that have less ambitious emissions rules,” the Parliament said. It also emphasized the tariff “must not be misused to further protectionism.” A member of the environment committee, Yannick Jadot, said, “It is a major political and democratic test for the EU, which must stop being naïve and impose the same carbon price on products, whether they are produced in or outside the EU, to ensure the most polluting sectors also take part in fighting climate change and innovate towards zero carbon. This will give us the best chance of remaining below the 1.5°C warming limit, whilst also pushing our trading partners to be equally ambitious in order to enter the EU market.” The Commission is expected to present a legislative proposal on a CBAM in the second quarter of 2021 as part of the European Green Deal.


2020 ◽  
Vol 208 ◽  
pp. 03055
Author(s):  
Anatoly Stepanov ◽  
Alexander Burnasov ◽  
Maria Ilyushkina ◽  
Yury Kovalev ◽  
Gulnara Nyussupova

The article considers the climate policy of the Baltic region countries. The reasons and factors for reducing CO2 emissions in the period 1990-2018 are analyzed, the relationship between the processes of decarbonization and the ecological transformation of farms are demonstrated. The EU influence on the climate policy of individual countries is studied. The features of evolution and the modern structure of the RES sector are explored. The assessment of measures to improve energy efficiency of national economies is given. According to the degree of climate policy efforts and the depth of the ecological transformation of national economies, a ranking scheme for the region countries is proposed.


2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 391-400 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katja Biedenkopf

European Union (EU) climate politics have polarised over the past decade. Poland especially stands out as the EU member state that has most vehemently opposed numerous decisions to increase the EU’s level of ambition, stirring some turbulence in EU climate politics. Yet, with the publication of the European Green Deal (EGD) in 2019, the European Commission has likewise created turbulence in the Polish parliament’s climate debate. This article analyses those debates and identifies three distinct policy narratives: <em>Poland is in a unique situation</em>, <em>Poland pursues an alternative pathway</em>, and <em>climate policy endangers competitiveness</em>. The <em>alternative pathway</em> narrative, which advocates for the continued use of coal while capturing emissions, faded at roughly the same time when the EGD was proposed at the EU level. Simultaneously, the <em>unique situation</em> narrative, which calls for recognition of Poland’s uniqueness in combination with increased (financial) support, became stronger. The analysis confirms the dominance of the governing party’s narratives, but contrary to previous studies, detects nascent polarisation on climate policy between the right-wing political parties, on the one hand, and the centre-right and centre-left parties, on the other.


Author(s):  
E. Burkova

This article considers the most relevant component of the global environmental problem – the climate one. The article aims to identify the reaction of a national state to the global climate challenge. The subject of consideration is climate policy and, more broadly, the whole set of reactions of the political sphere of society to the global climate change. Among the tasks set by the author is to understand the nature of setting and solving new climatic environmental problems, to find out how they fit into national development strategies, to establish the interdependence of the climate ambitions of countries with the type of development, the carbon intensity of their economies, the structure of exports, the degree of energy independence. The solution of these tasks is carried out on the example of a number of new independent states (including CIS ones). A brief comparative analysis of these countries’ and the EU climate activities is carried out. The breakthrough event of the European environmental policy – the Green Deal of 2019 is taken as a starting point for the analysis. The main attention is paid to the key instrument of the EU climate policy today – the border carbon tax. Additional attention is paid to the observance of the principles of social justice in the implementation of new environmental activities (a just transition mechanism). The paper pays special attention to the role of Russia in the global climatic process. An assessment of the state of the climate segment of the environmental protection industry of our country, as well as the prospects for its development, is given.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sidonie Ruban

&lt;p&gt;Citizens&amp;#8217; Climate Lobby is an international organization educating citizens and their political representatives on a solution that could on its own reach 80% of the Paris COP21 objectives. The beauty of this solution is that, although Climate Change is complex and thousands of solutions, regulations, fundings are already implemented, it is a unique and simple solution that would be much more effective and could complement existing ones in driving the change we need. However, this solution is new to most citizens and politicians and needs to be explained to citizens&amp;#8217;s volunteering for climate action, policy developers and politicians.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The focus on Carbon Pricing is based on the international economic and scientific consensus as the highest priority primary legislation to address climate change. The need to redistribute the revenues in the form of dividend or climate income is driven both by effectiveness and acceptability and has been enhanced by the Yellow Vest experience in France and the Covid 19 impact.&amp;#160;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Between 2014 and 2020 national teams within the EU have educated and lobbied to build political will with national governments in favour of Carbon Pricing as the most effective climate policy. In the last two years CCL began to work at the European level developing strategy to build political will for the essential support from the European Parliament to support and encourage consistent Carbon Pricing both inside the EU and Internationally.&amp;#160;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Starting with mutual respect and appreciation, more than 500 groups in more than 50 countries engage society in its widest sense. &amp;#8220;We seek to educate, build partnerships with and gain the support of community leaders and non-governmental organizations, both nationally and locally.&amp;#8221; In Europe CCL has active groups lobbying in Germany; France; Sweden; UK; Denmark; Norway; Spain; Poland &amp; Portugal. In the EU Parliament lobby experience is positive across a range of party groups with positive responses. This competency is currently being scaled up to build political will within the European Parliament.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;CCL France, CC Europe and CCE&amp;#160; trains individuals to engage in climate communication on a human level, learning about the concerns, beliefs, and values of the people they seek to educate about the benefits of climate action. This training relies on techniques that include developing effective listening skills, motivational interviewing, and practicing conversational scenarios.&amp;#160;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;In this presentation, we will explain and study&amp;#160;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;- how CCL is building consensus across the political spectrum: from the market based solution promoted to conservatives to the progressive and efficient solution promoted to social democrats, from &amp;#8220;carbon fee and dividend&amp;#8221; to &amp;#8220;climate income&amp;#8221;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;- the motivational interviewing used with politicians to build long term relationships and drive change.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;- the challenges to explain the solution, from citizens not familiar with carbon footprint nor economic externalities, to policy developers at the EU commission dealing with the Emission Trading System, the energy taxation directive or the border carbon adjustment&lt;/p&gt;


2020 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 421-456
Author(s):  
Claudio Franzius

Der motorisierte Individualverkehr ist in den Blick der Klimapolitik geraten. Von allen klimarelevanten Sektoren sind im Verkehrssektor die wenigsten CO2-Einsparungen festzustellen. Mit dem neuen Brennstoffemissionshandelsgesetz ist eine CO2-Bepreisung des Verkehrs auf den Weg gebracht worden, aber es wird bezweifelt, ob der nationale Emissionshandel hinreichende Lenkungswirkungen entfaltet und finanzverfassungsrechtlich zulässig ist. Es ist verfehlt, den Emissionshandel als Alternative zu ordnungsrechtlichen Instrumenten zu begreifen. Außerdem mahnt der Beitrag im Hinblick auf die verfassungsrechtliche Bewertung zur Vorsicht. Sinn macht der CO2-Preis für den Verkehr, wenn nachgeschärft wird. Dazu gehört eine beherzte Reform der Energiesteuern, aber auch die Einführung einer streckenbezogenen Pkw-Maut sowie eine übergreifende Verkehrsplanung. Im Ergebnis ist zu begrüßen, dass die CO2-Emissionen des Verkehrs einen Preis erhalten, aber naiv anzunehmen, allein darüber würde die Verkehrswende gelingen. Individual motorized transport has become the focus of climate policy. Of all the climate-relevant sectors, the transport sector has seen the fewest reductions in CO2 emissions. The new Fuel Emissions Trading Act (“Brennstoffemissionshandelsgesetz”) initiates carbon pricing for the transport sector. Nonetheless, it remains doubtful whether national emissions trading has sufficient steering effects and if it complies with the constitutional finance law. It would be erroneous to understand emissions trading as an alternative to regulatory instruments. In addition, the article urges caution with regard to the constitutional assessment. Moreover, carbon pricing for the traffic sector only makes sense if it is increased. This includes a courageous reform of energy taxes, but also the introduction of a route-based car toll and comprehensive traffic planning. As a result, carbon pricing of the transport sector is appreciated, however it would be naïve to assume that it alone would lead to a sustainable transport policy (“Verkehrswende”).


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