Information Regime Changes and Path Dependence - An Experimental Analysis of Public Goods Contributions in Heterogeneous Groups

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gerlinde Fellner-Röhling ◽  
Sabine Kröger ◽  
Erika Seki
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Experimental Analysis ◽  
Path Dependence ◽  
Regime Changes ◽  
Heterogeneous Groups ◽  
Information Regime

An Experimental Analysis of Unanimity in Public Goods Provision Mechanisms

1988 ◽  
Vol 55 (2) ◽  
pp. 301 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey S. Banks ◽  
Charles R. Plott ◽  
David P. Porter
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Experimental Analysis ◽  
Public Goods Provision

scholarly journals Heterogeneous groups cooperate in public good problems despite normative disagreements about individual contribution levels

2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kasper Otten ◽  
Vincent Buskens ◽  
Wojtek Przepiorka ◽  
Naomi Ellemers
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Individual Contribution ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Homogeneous Groups ◽  
The Public ◽  
Heterogeneous Groups ◽  
Good Provision ◽  
Good Individual

Abstract Norms can promote human cooperation to provide public goods. Yet, the potential of norms to promote cooperation may be limited to homogeneous groups in which all members benefit equally from the public good. Individual heterogeneity in the benefits of public good provision is commonly conjectured to bring about normative disagreements that harm cooperation. However, the role of these normative disagreements remains unclear because they are rarely directly measured or manipulated. In a laboratory experiment, we first measure participants’ views on the appropriate way to contribute to a public good with heterogeneous returns. We then use this information to sort people into groups that either agree or disagree on these views, thereby manipulating group-level disagreement on normative views. Participants subsequently make several incentivized contribution decisions in a public goods game with peer punishment. We find that although there are considerable disagreements about individual contribution levels in heterogeneous groups, these disagreements do not impede cooperation. While cooperation is maintained because low contributors are punished, participants do not use punishment to impose their normative views on others. The contribution levels at which groups cooperate strongly relate to the average normative views of these groups.

scholarly journals Decision Costs and Welfare Effects of Democratic Voting Rules: an Experimental Analysis

2012 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 159-183
Author(s):  
Ulrich Glassmann ◽  
Jan Sauermann
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Experimental Analysis ◽  
Majority Rule ◽  
Welfare Effects ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Voting Rules ◽  
Unanimity Rule ◽  
Theoretical Approaches ◽  
Critical Revision ◽  
Pareto Efficient

AbstractWhat impact do majority rule and unanimity rule have on welfare and decision costs? According to Buchanan and Tullock ([1962] 1999) the unanimity principle must be regarded as a democratic norm, because it guarantees Pareto-efficient welfare effects. We present experimental results from a public goods game, which demonstrate in contrast to this assumption that majority rule can produce greater welfare effects than unanimity rule. This result suggests a critical revision of theoretical approaches which narrow the legiti­macy of majority rule in this respect.

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