Ambiguous Sticks and Carrots: The Effect of Contract Framing and Payoff Ambiguity on Employee Effort

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Burke ◽  
Kristy L. Towry ◽  
Donald Young ◽  
Jacob Zureich
Keyword(s):  
Employee Effort ◽  
Contract Framing

The Effects of Contract Framing on Misconduct and Entitlement

2018 ◽  
Vol 94 (3) ◽  
pp. 329-344 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer E. Nichol
Keyword(s):  
Data Availability ◽  
Incentive Contract ◽  
Contract Framing ◽  
Sense Of Entitlement

ABSTRACT This study examines the effects of incentive contract framing on misreporting and entitlement. I conduct a 2 × 2 between-subjects experiment, manipulating incentive contract framing (Bonus/Penalty) and the awareness of the opportunity to misreport (Before Effort/After Effort). I predict and find that (1) penalty contracts cause a higher rate and degree of misreporting, and (2) this greater misreporting occurs due to a greater sense of entitlement to the incentive funds. Collectively, this study's theory and results indicate that while penalty contracts can sometimes increase effort relative to bonus contracts, they also encourage greater dishonesty in reporting when that effort is not successful. Data Availability: Contact the author.

The Combined Effect of Wages and Firm Profit on Employee Effort

2005 ◽  
Vol 80 (1) ◽  
pp. 167-188 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. Lynn Hannan
Keyword(s):  
Gift Exchange ◽  
Experimental Results ◽  
Combined Effect ◽  
Financial Reward ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Employee Effort ◽  
Profit Maximizing ◽  
Firm Profit ◽  
As If

This study investigates whether paying higher wages motivates employees to provide higher effort and whether firm profit moderates this relation. Consistent with gift exchange (Akerlof 1982) and reciprocity (Rabin 1993) models, my experimental results show that workers provided more effort when they were paid higher wages even though there was no ex post financial reward for doing so. Moreover, firm profit influenced the relation between wages and effort. Workers provided higher effort when firm profit decreased compared to when it increased. This suggests that the degree of reciprocity is affected by firm profit. However, workers' responded asymmetrically to firm profit, in that they behaved as if they expected to share in firm profit increases but not decreases. Although firms were fairly adept at predicting the profit-maximizing wage strategy, they apparently did not anticipate workers' reluctance to share in firm profit decreases.

scholarly journals Hermeneutical Injustice, Contract Law, and Global Value Chains

2020 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 139-159
Author(s):  
Lyn K.L. Tjon Soei Len
Keyword(s):  
Social Power ◽  
Global Value Chains ◽  
Contract Law ◽  
Value Chains ◽  
Party Autonomy ◽  
Normative Constraint ◽  
Contract Framing ◽  
Exchange Relations

AbstractGlobal value chains (GVCs) resist dominant contract framing, because presumptions about contract’s bilateral structure and party autonomy fail to capture the complex interconnections between private exchange relations. Contract law seems to obscure, rather than capture, the ways in which the relationships and experiences of various actors in GVCs are linked. This article argues that, in doing so, contract law contributes to systemic hermeneutical injustice. Systemic hermeneutical injustice captures how shared interpretative resources can render those in disadvantaged positions of social power unable to make intelligible that what is in their interest to render intelligible. The article’s primary aim is to show how this form of injustice bears on contract law and how it can function as an independent normative constraint on the institution of contract law.

scholarly journals ANTESEEDEN DAN KONSEKUENSI DARI SEVERITY OF OTHER CUSTOMER FAILURE

2011 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 73
Author(s):  
Nina Budiwati ◽  
Asep Hermawan
Keyword(s):  
Data Analysis ◽  
Customer Satisfaction ◽  
Structural Equation Model ◽  
Structural Equation ◽  
Service Recovery ◽  
Equation Model ◽  
Unit Of Analysis ◽  
Recovery Expectations ◽  
Employee Effort ◽  
Customer Misbehavior

<span><em>The background of this research was to conduct a profound study of impact of other-customer failure </em><span><em>The purpose of this paper is to investigate how and why other-customer misbehavior has a negative </em><span><em>influence on customer satisfaction with the service firm.</em><br /><span><em>The objectives of this research was : (a) the effect of controllability to firm responsibility, (b) the effect </em><span><em>of stability to firm responsibility, (c) the effect of firm responsibility to customer satisfaction, (d) the </em><span><em>effect of firm responsibility to service recovery expectations, (e) the effect of service recovery </em><span><em>expectations to customer satisfaction, (f) the effect of severity of other customer failure to service </em><span><em>recovery expectations, (g) the effect of severity of other customer failure to customer satisfaction, (h) </em><span><em>the effect of perceived employee effort to customer satisfaction.</em><br /><span><em>The design of this research applies a survey toward unit of analysis on hotels services by interview the </em><span><em>customers for testing hypothesis. Meanwhile the required data consist of seventh variables which are</em><br /><span><em>controllability attributions, stability attributions, firm responsibility, service recovery expectation, </em><span><em>severity of other customer failure, perceived employee effort and customer satisfaction. The aggregate</em><br /><span><em>numbers of hotels guests being respondent of the study are 200. Data analysis used in this research </em><span><em>was consists of Structural Equation Model Analysis by AMOS 6 as software.</em><br /><span><em>The result of this research conclude that controllability and stability attributions had an effect to firm </em><span><em>responsibility, firm responsibility had an effect to service recovery expectations, severity of other</em><br /><span><em>customer failure had an effect to service recovery expactations, and perceived employee effort had an </em><span><em>effect to customer satisfaction. Meanwhile firm responsibility had an effect to customer satisfaction,</em><br /><span><em>service recovery expectations had an effect terhadap customer satisfaction, severity of other customer </em><span><em>failure had an effect to customer satisfaction.</em><br /><span><em>Keywords: </em><span><em>Service recovery expectations, severity of other customer failure, and customer satisfaction</em></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br /></span></span>

The Relationship between New Work Practices and Employee Effort

2010 ◽  
Vol 52 (2) ◽  
pp. 219-235 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea Ollo-Lopez ◽  
Alberto Bayo-Moriones ◽  
Martin Larraza-Kintana
Keyword(s):  
New Work ◽  
Work Practices ◽  
Employee Effort ◽  
The Relationship

Bonus versus Penalty: Does Contract Frame Affect Employee Effort?

2005 ◽  
pp. 151-169 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. Lynn Hannan ◽  
Vicky B. Hoffman ◽  
Donald V. Moser
Keyword(s):  
Employee Effort

scholarly journals Temporary contracts and employee effort

2005 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 281-299 ◽  
Author(s):  
Axel Engellandt ◽  
Regina T. Riphahn
Keyword(s):  
Temporary Contracts ◽  
Employee Effort
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