Science and the Market for Technology

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ashish Arora ◽  
Sharon Belenzon ◽  
Jungkyu Suh
Keyword(s):  
Market For Technology

scholarly journals History Lessons: The Early Development of Intellectual Property Institutions in the United States

2001 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 233-246 ◽  
Author(s):  
B. Zorina Khan ◽  
Kenneth L Sokoloff
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual Property ◽  
Technical Change ◽  
The United States ◽  
Central Feature ◽  
Public Disclosure ◽  
Property System ◽  
Private Market ◽  
Strict Enforcement ◽  
Market For Technology ◽  
The U.S

The U.S. was a pioneer in establishing the world's first modern intellectual property system. That system was distinguished by the provision of broad access to, and strict enforcement of, property rights in new inventions, coupled with the requirement of public disclosure, and it was effective at stimulating the growth of a market for technology and technical change more generally. Far from being static, fundamental modifications were introduced over time in response to changing circumstances. That such adjustments so often proved to be constructive owes partly to a private market being a central feature of the system, and partly to the democratic structure of U.S. institutions.

scholarly journals Science and the Market for Technology

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ashish Arora ◽  
Sharon Belenzon ◽  
Jungkyu Suh
Keyword(s):  
Market For Technology

How Reliable Is the Market for Technology?

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 (1) ◽  
pp. 17031
Author(s):  
Vincenzo Palermo ◽  
Marco Ceccagnoli ◽  
Matthew J Higgins
Keyword(s):  
Market For Technology

Managing Licensing in a Market for Technology

2012 ◽  
Vol 2012 (1) ◽  
pp. 16539
Author(s):  
Lori Rosenkopf ◽  
Thomas Ronde ◽  
Andrea Fosfuri ◽  
Ashish Arora
Keyword(s):  
Market For Technology

scholarly journals Licensing the market for technology

2003 ◽  
Vol 52 (2) ◽  
pp. 277-295 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ashish Arora ◽  
Andrea Fosfuri
Keyword(s):  
Market For Technology

scholarly journals R&D Delegation in a Duopoly with Spillovers

2009 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruno Versaevel ◽  
Désiré Vencatachellum
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
The Other ◽  
Soft Or ◽  
Transfer Payments ◽  
For Profit ◽  
Market For Technology ◽  
Intensity Of Competition ◽  
Common Laboratory

Abstract There is evidence that competing firms outsource R&D to the same independent for-profit laboratory. We draw on this stylized fact to construct a model where two firms in the same industry offer transfer payments in exchange for user-specific R&D services from a common laboratory. Inter-firm and within-laboratory externalities affect the intensity of competition among delegating firms on the intermediate market for technology. Whether competition is relatively soft or tight is reflected by each firm's monetary offers to the laboratory. These offers determine the R&D outcomes, the laboratory's capacity to earn benefits, the profits for the delegating firms, as well as social welfare. We identify the situations in which the laboratory finds it profitable to deliver services to only one firm, or to both of them. In the latter case we compare the delegated R&D game to two other ones where firms conduct in-house R&D, either cooperatively or non-cooperatively. The delegated R&D game Pareto dominates the other two games, and the laboratory earns positive benefits, if and only if R&D services are complementary inside the laboratory, but only limitedly so, and inter-firm spillovers are sufficiently low. The firms' privately-profitable decision to delegate R&D, when the laboratory participates, always benefits consumers.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document