Signaling Behavior, Congressional-Executive Agreements, and the SALT I Interim Agreement

2003 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher B. Stone
Keyword(s):  
Executive Agreements

Executive Agreements Relating to Panama

1943 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 482-489
Author(s):  
L. H. Woolsey
Keyword(s):  
Executive Agreements

The Philippines

2019 ◽  
pp. 405-432
Author(s):  
Romel Regalado Bagares
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Direct Effect ◽  
The Philippines ◽  
The State ◽  
State Of Exception ◽  
Paradoxical Phenomenon ◽  
Legal Obligations ◽  
Entry Points ◽  
Executive Agreements ◽  
Rule Making

This chapter assesses international law in the Philippines. The primary entry points of international law in Philippine jurisdiction are the Incorporation Clause and the Treaty Clause of the 1987 Charter. The chapter considers the paradoxical phenomenon of the supposedly dualist device of treaties opening a quasi-monist door to international legal obligations in the form of executive agreements that do not require the concurrence of the Senate but become binding on the Philippines by Executive imprimatur. Moreover, as quasi-monist devices, executive agreements function both as a sword, giving direct effect to international law—especially in the protection of rights—and as a shield, raising barriers to public or international accountability according to political considerations. The four other entry points for international law in Philippine practice include the direct effect by the Supreme Court’s rule-making powers, constitutionalization, statutory application, and international law in the State of Exception.

scholarly journals Senate Treatment of Select International Agreements, 2013–2018

AJIL Unbound ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 113 ◽  
pp. 184-188
Author(s):  
Margaret L. Taylor
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Relations ◽  
Mind Wandering ◽  
Executive Branch ◽  
International Agreements ◽  
Political Dynamics ◽  
Capitol Hill ◽  
Different Types ◽  
The Face ◽  
Executive Agreements ◽  
Paris Climate Agreement

When I finished reading Julian Nyarko's “Giving the Treaty a Purpose: Comparing the Durability of Treaties and Executive Agreements,” I found my mind wandering through memories of the more than five years I spent working on Capitol Hill as Counsel for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC)—a role that often required me to figure out how best to preserve the constitutional prerogatives of Congress in the face of the various types of international agreements the executive branch produced. This essay recounts my impressions of how the Senate handled different agreements in the 2013–2018 timeframe—Article II treaties, the Paris Climate Agreement, and the Iran Nuclear Agreement. Unlike Professor Nyarko's ambitious and impressive work to categorize and statistically analyze the durability of Article II treaties and executive agreements—which I applaud and find useful—this essay is modest in purpose. I contend that how Congress handles different types of agreements is largely a product of specific political dynamics—including political ownership, policy entrepreneurism, and electoral risk—that can be unpredictable. Because of these dynamics, the differences that Nyarko reveals regarding the durability of Article II treaties and executive agreements are unlikely to produce a significant change in official practice.

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