Large Shareholder Premium

Optimal Trading by a 'Large Shareholder'

SSRN Electronic Journal ◽

10.2139/ssrn.276295 ◽

2001 ◽

Cited By ~ 10

Author(s):

Peter M. DeMarzo ◽

Branko Urosevic

Keyword(s):

Optimal Trading ◽

Large Shareholder

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Managerial Compensation, Voluntary Disclosure, and Large Shareholder Monitoring

SSRN Electronic Journal ◽

10.2139/ssrn.687462 ◽

2008 ◽

Cited By ~ 5

Author(s):

N.K. Chidambaran ◽

Kose John

Keyword(s):

Voluntary Disclosure ◽

Managerial Compensation ◽

Large Shareholder

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Large Shareholder Diversification, Corporate Risk Taking, and the Benefits of Changing to Differential Voting Rights

SSRN Electronic Journal ◽

10.2139/ssrn.1961347 ◽

2011 ◽

Author(s):

Scott W. Bauguess ◽

Myron B. Slovin ◽

Marie E. Sushka

Keyword(s):

Risk Taking ◽

Voting Rights ◽

Large Shareholder ◽

Corporate Risk

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Large Shareholder Activism, Risk Sharing, and Financial Market Equilibrium

Journal of Political Economy ◽

10.1086/261965 ◽

1994 ◽

Vol 102 (6) ◽

pp. 1097-1130 ◽

Cited By ~ 440

Author(s):

Anat R. Admati ◽

Paul Pfleiderer ◽

Josef Zechner

Keyword(s):

Financial Market ◽

Risk Sharing ◽

Market Equilibrium ◽

Shareholder Activism ◽

Large Shareholder

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GOVERNANCE WITH COMPLEX STRUCTURES: EVIDENCE FROM WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

Journal of Business Economics and Management ◽

10.3846/16111699.2013.772915 ◽

2014 ◽

Vol 16 (3) ◽

pp. 542-557 ◽

Cited By ~ 4

Author(s):

Mário S. Santos ◽

António C. Moreira ◽

Elisabete S. Vieira

Keyword(s):

Firm Value ◽

Family Firms ◽

Complex Structures ◽

Significant Positive Effect ◽

Large Shareholder ◽

Legal Context ◽

Relevant Role ◽

Western European ◽

Positive Effect ◽

Moderating Role

This paper investigates if the existence of complex structures plays an important role in corporate governance. It uses GMM estimation on a panel of Western European firms. We find that the presence of a second and third large shareholder has a significant positive effect on firm value. This study underlines the importance of the number of blockholders as a determinant of firm value, when taken as a moderator of the contestability effect. It shows that the legal context and company-specific characteristics play a crucial moderating role for contestability. In contrast to previous research, we find that contestability plays a less relevant role in family firms. We also find that this last result does not vary significantly with the identity of the remaining elements of the coalition. Also, our study suggests that contestability is less important in companies led by majority shareholders.

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